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We analyze all but a few of the 47 charter schools operating in New York City in 2005-06. The schools
tend to locate in disadvantaged neighborhoods and serve students who are substantially poorer than the
average public school student in New York City. The schools also attract black applicants to an unusual
degree, not only relative to New York City but also relative to the traditional public schools from which
they draw. The vast majority of applicants are admitted in lotteries that the schools hold when oversubscribed,
and the vast majority of the lotteries are balanced. By balanced, we mean that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that there are no differences in the observable characteristics of lotteried-in and lotteried-out
students. Using the lotteries to form an intention-to-treat variable, we instrument for actual enrollment
and compute the charter schools' average treatment-on-the-treated effects on achievement. These are
0.09 standard deviations per year of treatment in math and 0.04 standard deviations per year in reading.
We estimate correlations between charter schools' policies and their effects on achievement. The policy
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I.  INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK  CITY'S  CHARTER  SCHOOLS
In this article, we analyze which students enroll in New York City's charter schools and how the
charter schools affect their achievement.  This is the first report aimed at a research audience from a
continuing study of the charter schools in the City.  We expect that follow-up reports will be available on
an annual basis.  A non-technical report that covers the same topics as this article but that is aimed at
educators and policy makers is available.
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We attempt to provide descriptive evidence on the students who apply to charter schools, the
students who are offered places at charter schools (usually through lotteries), and the students who
actually enroll in and attend charter schools.  We compare these students to New York City's overall
student population, to students in the traditional public schools from which the charter schools draw, to
students who apply to charter schools but are not offered places (the "lotteried-out"), and to students who
apply to charter schools but do not enroll (either because they are lotteried-out or because they decide not
to attend despite being offered a place).  We describe students on the basis of race, ethnicity, their
classification for various school-based programs (such as free lunch and special education), and their pre-
application test scores (available only for students who had reached at least third grade when they
applied).  The descriptive evidence just mentioned should help us understand who self-selects into charter
schools and how their departure from the traditional public schools affects the population of students
enrolled there.  However, there are no right answers in this part of the evidence.  That is, there is no type
of student whom charter schools should or should not enroll given that they are schools whom students
are supposed to free to choose or to ignore.
We find that, in practice, charter schools attract students who are disadvantaged relative to New
York City's population of public school students.  Relative to the students who would likely have been
their classmates had they remained in the traditional public schools, charter schools applicants are more
likely to be black but are otherwise fairly similar.  We are cautious about this last result because, on
dimensions other than gender and race, it is not possible to compare the typical charter school applicant to
students in the traditional public schools.  We explain the need for caution below.
We attempt to estimate the causal effect of the charter schools on their students' test scores,
focusing on New York's statewide tests.  Our estimation strategy makes use of the fact that the vast
majority of charter school students (94 percent of 2005-06 applicants) are admitted via lotteries held
among applicants.  (A lottery is not held only if a school is undersubscribed.  Undersubscription occurs2
most often in a school's start-up year.)  We show that lotteried-in and lotteried-out applicants are very
similar in a statistical sense.  We also show that the vast majority of students who participate in lotteries
are in a lottery that is "balanced," meaning that we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that the
lotteried-in and lotteried-out students are the same on all observable characteristics.  Lotteries that balance
on observable characteristics are also likely to balance on unobservable characteristics such as motivation,
which can cause selection bias if left unbalanced.  We therefore use students who participated in balanced
lotteries to compare post-application test scores of lotteried-in and lotteried-out students. Specifically, we
estimate treatment-on-the-treated effects, using the indicator for being lotteried-in to form an intention-to-
treat instrument for actual enrollment in a charter school.  We believe that the resulting estimates are
credibly causal effects of attending a New York City charter school relative to the counterfactual of
remaining in the traditional public schools from which charter schools draw.
While it is reasonable to extrapolate the findings to other urban students who are similar to New
York City applicants, we would argue against these results being extrapolated to students who differ
substantially from applicants to the charter schools.  In particular, the results should not be extrapolated to
students who are substantially more advantaged or to students who would not be interested in applying to
the types of charter schools available in New York City, even if they were conveniently located in the
students' area.  We also note that the counterfactual--that is, the traditional public schools--may be
affected by the presence of nearby charter schools.  For instance, if traditional public schools improve
when faced with competition from charter schools, then lotteried-out students are likely better off than
they would have been in the entire absence of charter schools.  There is unfortunately nothing we can do
to produce a counterfactual that is entirely purged of the influence of charter schools, but we surmise that
the charter schools' influence on the counterfactual is still fairly small owing to the small scale of charter
school enrollment relative to New York City's public school population.
We find that the causal effect on math test scores in the third through eighth grades is a positive
0.09 standard deviations per year of attendance in a New York City charter school.  The parallel causal
effect on reading test scores is just about half as large:  0.04 standard deviations per year of attendance in
a New York City charter school.  These are average effects based on all available student scores.   We
have thus far observed so few charter school applicants take Regents Examinations that we cannot
compute causal effects of charter schools for the examinations in most subjects.  For the Math A exam
(only), we can compute an estimate, but even this estimate is so imprecise that it is not meaningful.  
We expect to be able to describe more interesting results from Regents Examinations in future
years as more charter school applicants take the exams.
Because charter schools make independent policy decisions and are independently managed, it is3
reasonable to expect individual schools' effects to vary around the average effects just described and they
do.  While we do not identify any individual school's effects with its name in this study, we do describe
the variation in the effects that we estimate for individual schools.  It is important to note that a number of
charter schools have thus far had so few test-taking students that we cannot compute the individual
school's effects on achievement with enough precision to make the results meaningful.  Nevertheless, the
test scores of students at such schools are included when we compute the average charter school effects
described above.
We use multiple regression in an attempt to identify school policies and practices that are
associated with more positive estimated effects on achievement.  These associations cannot be interpreted
as causal effects because charter schools may adopt policies in response to factors that we do not observe. 
These unobserved factors may themselves affect achievement.  Thus, the regression results reflect
correlation, not causation.  In addition, schools tend to adopt "packages" of policies, causing a substantial
multicollinearity problem.  For instance, schools with long school years very often also have long school
days.  We find statistically significant partial correlations between policy and achievement for only a few
individual policies.  However, we also find statistically significant partial correlations between certain
packages of policies and achievement.  All such correlations should be interpreted with caution, not only
because they are not causal but also because they are very preliminary.  That is, we would not be
surprised to find that the correlations change substantially with next year's report, as an additional year's
worth of data (with a corresponding increase in the number of schools, grades, and students covered) is
added to the study.
We show a variety of specification tests to assess the robustness of our empirical strategy. We
explore a number of other topics such as whether achievement effects vary with a student's grade at test-
taking, whether achievement effects vary with the grade at which the student entered the charter school,
and so on.  In no case are we able to discern interesting patterns, possibly because the data are still
insufficient to support fine cuts of the results but probably because students at a given charter school
(regardless of grade and entry) have more in common than students in a given grade across all charter
schools.
II.  Some Background on Charter Schools in New York City
A charter school is a public school that operates fairly autonomously within guidelines laid down
by its state.  Charter schools are generally free to manage day-to-day operations, hire teachers and let
them go, choose salary schedules, and make curricular decisions.  Charter schools must advertise their
availability to all students who are eligible to attend the public schools, and they are not allowed to select4
  See Center for Education Reform (2007).
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  The New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 (as amended) is Article 56, Sections 2850 to
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2857 of the New York State Consolidated Laws.
  They were part of the "New Visions" initiative started by New York City Schools Chancellor
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Rudy Crewe (X).  When they converted, they brought with populations of students who applied and who
were admitted partly on the basis of a lottery and partly on the basis of priorities decided by the  
students.  Specifically, if a charter school in New York receives more applicants than it has places, it must
hold a random lottery among the applicants.  Lotteries are specific to a school, grade, and year of intended
entry--for instance, the lottery for the fourth grade class commencing in fall 2005 in charter school X.
When a charter school enrolls a student, the student essentially brings a "fee" with him that is tax-
financed.  In New York State, a formula determines this fee and it is usually between two-thirds and four-
fifths of what would be spent on the student's education if he remained in the traditional public schools.  
2
Charter schools that are moving into or renovating facilities may also get some funding from the state's
Stimulus Fund.  However, the key thing to remember about charter schools is that they cannot survive if
they cannot attract students because they will simply not have the necessary funds.  Thus, families
automatically exercise some governance over charter schools when they "vote with their feet" by
choosing whether to apply or whether to keep their child enrolled.  In addition to this governance
exercised by parents, charter schools must get initial approval for their start-up from an authorizer, who
examines proposals and accepts some and rejects others on the basis of educational and fiscal soundness. 
Every few years (five in New York), a charter school must have its charter renewed by this same
authorizer.  Charter renewal is typically a period of scrutiny for the school. Between renewals, a charter
school's leaders must answer to their board, which is typically composed of local leaders, people from
community organizations, and other educators.  Finally, charter schools--being public schools--participate
fully in their state's and the federal government's accountability system.  For instance, their student take
all statewide tests.
In New York State, charter schools are authorized by the Charter Schools Act of 1998.  In the
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first year of operation for charter schools, 2000-01, ten schools began operating.  Four of the schools
(Wildcat Academy, Renaissance, KIPP Academy, and Beginning with Children) were conversions of
previously-existing public schools that had had unusual programs and autonomy.   Subsequently, five
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schools opened in 2001, two schools opened in 2002, five schools opened in 2003, nine schools opened in
2004, and eleven schools opened in 2005 (including one conversion school, Future Leaders Institute).
This article is the first research-oriented report from a multi-year study in which we hope to5
engage all New York City charter schools with an exception described below.  When we refer to this
"article" or "report," we mean this document.  When we refer to the "study," we mean the ongoing study. 
Because there are new schools opening each year in New York, some schools that currently exist are not
covered by this article even though they are participating in the study.  The 2005-06 school year is the
most recent period for which we have achievement data for this report.
A.  Participation by New York City Charter Schools in this Study
There were 47 charter schools operating in New York City as of the 2005-06, and all but a few
are participating in the study.  Two schools, Manhattan Charter School and South Bronx Charter School
for International Cultures and the Arts, are not included in this report but are participating in the study. 
Because the two schools do not yet have any students in test-taking grades, their not being included in
this report has no effect on the achievement results.  One school, Readnet Bronx Charter School, was in
the process of closing in 2005-06.  We will include this school in future reports if we are able to retrieve
information retrospectively about applicants to the school's lotteries.  The omission of Readnet Bronx is
likely to have only small effects because the school had only two years of test-taking students:  third and
fourth graders in 2005-06 and third graders in 2004-05.  The NY Center for Autism Charter School is not
included in the study because it serves a very special population and is not compatible with many
elements of the study. The United Federation of Teachers Elementary Charter School has declined to
participate in the study thus far.  Because it does not yet any students in test-taking grades, its not being
included in this report has no effect on the achievement results.
All of the other charter schools in New York City are covered by this year's report.  For the 
number of students from each application year who are included in the study, see Table 5, which is
discussed below.
Aggregate results reported in this report, for instance the average effect of charter schools on
math scores, reflect the student's experience.  Thus charter schools that enroll more students generally
have more effect on the overall results.  Given the principles on which charter schools are based, this
student-weighted approach is the right one.  If successful charter schools expand and unsuccessful ones
shrink, we should not attempt un-do these dynamics with statistics.  The expansion and shrinkage is part
of the charter school policy, which is intended to create an average student experience in which
unsuccessful schools are forced to play a small role and successful schools are allowed to play a big role.  
B.  Grades Served by New York City Charter Schools
Of the 42 charter schools covered by this article, four plan eventually to serve all of grades
kindergarten through twelve.  26 schools plan to focus on elementary grades. (One school plans to serve
grades kindergarten through four, twelve schools plan to serve grades kindergarten through five, four6
  Owing to the peculiarities of New York City school facilities and the large number of special
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schools within the traditional public system, some charter schools have intake grades that would not be
obvious based on the range of grades they serve.  For instance, one might expect that Renaissance Charter
School, which serves kindergarten through grade twelve, would do nearly all of its intake in kindergarten
and grade one.  In fact, the facilities it was granted allow it to serve only one class per grade through
fourth grade and two classes per grade thereafter.  Also, its students are fairly successful in gaining
admissions to the International Baccalaureate school which begins with the seventh grade and some of the
more sought-after high schools, such as the exam schools, which begin with the ninth grade.  In short, the
school has several intake or partial intake grades:  kindergarten, first, fifth, seventh, and ninth.
schools plan to serve grades kindergarten through six, ten schools plan to serve grades kindergarten
through eight, and one school plans to serve grades one through eight.) The remaining schools plan to
focus on traditional middle-school grades or a combination of middle and high school grades.  (Four
schools plan eventually to serve grades five through eight, four plan to serve grades five through twelve,
one plans to serve grades six through twelve, one plans to serve grades eight through twelve, and one
plans to serve grades nine through twelve.)  Table 1 shows the number of schools operating during each
recent school year and the grades being served that year.
Often, charter schools in New York City open with only their lowest grade, the “intake” grade,
and add a grade each subsequent year.  This is known as "rolling up."  For example, a charter high school
may open with only ninth grade.  By rolling up, the school serves all of the high school grades from nine
to twelve by its fourth year of operation.  Because kindergarten and first grade are both traditional intake
grades, charter elementary schools in New York City often open with both kindergarten and first grade. 
By their fifth year of operation, they have rolled up to serving kindergarten through grade five.  Rolling is
supposed to give schools a manageable way to grow and to instill their school’s culture and standards into
students.
Charter schools do not always roll up.  Some open by admitting students into intake and non-
intake grades alike.  Schools that convert to charter school status in New York City typically do so with
their full complement of grades.  As a rule, however, once a school gets past its first year or two of
operation, its admissions are dominated by its intake grades.  Non-intake grades admit only a trickle of
students to fill places that happen to open up when students depart.  Thus, a charter elementary school
might run a kindergarten lottery to fill 50 places, a first grade lottery to fill 25 places, and second through
fifth grade lotteries to fill a couple of places in each of those grades.
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Table 2 shows how applicants to New York City charter schools by the grade to which they
applied.  The intake grades of kindergarten, one, five, and nine stand out.  Almost one third of applicants
applied to kindergarten, and just under one half of all applicants applied to kindergarten or grade one.  147
percent of applicants applied to grade five and 2.5 percent applied to grade nine.  Apart from these intake
grades, the percentage of applicants declines monotonically with the grade level.  Table 2 actually
understates the degree to which the intake grades dominate current and will dominate future admissions. 
This is because the table includes years in which numerous charter schools in New York opened (see
Table 1), and we have pointed out that start-up schools sometimes admit whole cohorts of students into
non-intake grades.
C.  The Neighborhoods where Charter Schools are Located within New York City
In 2005-06, charter schools were located in all of the boroughs of New York City except for
Staten Island.  See Figure 1, which maps the schools' locations.  Notice the clusters of charter schools in
Harlem (Manhattan) and in the South Bronx.
When a charter school, especially one that serves elementary grades, locates in a neighborhood, it
can expect to serve students who are disproportionately from that neighborhood.  Thus, it is useful to
know how the charter schools' neighborhoods compare to the rest of New York City.  Table 3 shows
census data for the average tract in which a charter school is located and for all the tracts in New York
City.  Charter schools locate in neighborhoods that have unusually low proportions of white and Asian
residents and unusually high proportions of black and Hispanic residents.  Families in charter schools'
census tracts have disproportionately low median incomes and are disproportionately likely to be below
the poverty line.  The adults in these tracts have disproportionately low educational attainment, and the
children are disproportionately likely to be living with a single parent.  62 percent of the charter schools
are located in a tract where, relative to the New York City averages, a high percentage of families live in
poverty (greater than 21.2 percent), a low percentage of adults have bachelor degrees (lower than 27.4
percent), and a high percentage of children live with single parents (greater than 28.8 percent). Another
17 percent of the charter schools are located in neighborhoods that satisfy two of the three above criteria. 
The only charter school located in an affluent tract, Wildcat Academy, is exclusively for likely high
school drop-outs.  Its location is sensible not because its students reside near the school but because they
do internships with firms as part of their education.  Many firms are located close to the school.
D.  The Authorizers and Operating Agencies of New York City's Charter Schools
There are three agencies with the power to authorize charter schools in New York City: the
trustees of the State University of New York, the Chancellor of the New York City Schools, and the New
York State Board of Regents. When a group of individuals decides to form a charter school, they write a
proposal. They may submit this proposal to only one authorizer at a time. As of the 2005-06 school year,
the trustees of the State University of New York had authorized 20 of the charter schools covered by this
report and the Chancellor had authorized 19.  The Board of Regents had authorized only three schools in8
New York City but had authorized many charter schools in the state, outside of the city.  See Figure 2.
Each charter school has an operating agency.  If, as is typical, the operating agency helped to
write the charter school proposal, it is also called the founding agency.  There are three types of operating
agencies in New York City:  non-profit Community Grown Organizations (CGOs), non-profit Charter
Management Organizations (CMOs), and for-profit Education Management Organizations (EMOs). 
CMOs and EMOs are formal organizations that exist to manage charter schools, and they function
somewhat like firms that have a strong brand and that establish fairly independent branches or franchises. 
CMOs and EMOs typically make overarching curricular and policy decisions, conduct back office
activities, and provide something of a career ladder for teachers and administrators within their network
of schools.  The CMO with the most schools in New York City as 2005-06 is the KIPP Foundation, and
the EMO with the most schools is Victory Schools
The CGO category is something of a catch-all and, thus, CGO schools are much more varied. 
They may be founded by a group of parents, a group of teachers, a community organization that provides
local social services, one or more philanthropists, or the teachers union.  More often than not, the
founding group combines people from a few of the groups listed above.  We classify the conversion
charter schools as CGOs because they were started by groups like those listed above.  Figure 3 shows that
56 percent of the charter school students covered by this report attend 23 schools whose agencies are
CGOs, 19 percent attend 12 schools whose agencies are CMOs, and 25 percent attend 7 schools whose
agencies are EMOs.  Notice that the average school with an EMO has considerably larger enrollment (3.6
percent of enrollment per school) than the average school with a CGO (2.4 percent of enrollment per
school) or a CMO (1.6 percent of enrollment per school).
E.  The Missions and Characteristics of New York City Charter Schools
Each charter school describes itself in a carefully crafted mission statement that sets out its vision,
educational philosophy, and focus.  The statements are prominent on the schools' materials for
prospective parents, student, and staff, so it is fair to assume that they reflect a school's tendencies (if not
ex ante, then ex post as they attract people to whom the statement appeals).  While we cannot reduce
mission statements to simple variables, we can categorize them roughly into five groups:  those with a
child-centered or progressive educational philosophy (29 percent of students); those with a general or
traditional educational mission (28 percent of students); those with a rigorous academic focus (25 percent
of students); those that target a particular population of students (11 percent of students); and those in
which a certain aspect of the curriculum is paramount (7 percent of students).  Figure 4 shows the
proportions of students and schools in each category. 
There is a good deal of overlap in schools' missions, but a few key features allowed us to put9
them into categories.  Child-centered or progressive schools typically seek to develop students’ love of
learning, respect for others, and creativity.  Such schools’ mission statements may also focus on helping
students realize their potential and on building strong connections between students and their families and
communities.  Schools with a general or traditional educational mission typically seek to develop
students’ core skills and would like to see them meet or exceed New York State's academic standards. 
Schools with a rigorous academic focus have mission statements that almost exclusively mention
academic goals such as excelling in school and going to college.  These schools also frequently state that
they would like their students to become leaders.  Schools with a mission to serve a targeted population of
students include those that focus on low-income students, special needs students, likely drop-outs, male
students, and female students.  The remaining schools use a special focus, such as science or the arts, to
structure their whole curriculum.
There are many reasons to expect that charter schools will choose different policies and practices. 
They are independent and fairly autonomous.  Their operating agencies have a variety of histories and
priorities.  All are young schools and more likely to experiment with new policies than are established
schools.  At the same time, there are reasons to think that New York City's charter schools will share
certain policies.  They commonly serve disadvantaged students; they are all under pressure to attract
parents and to satisfy a small number of authorizers; they may imitate one another consciously by
deliberating adopting another school's policy that seems to be working; they may also imitate one another
unconsciously (as when teachers who have worked at one school are hired by another and bring their
knowledge with them).
Table 4, which shows the share of the charter schools with each of a number of characteristics,
demonstrates that the schools vary a lot but that there are also distinguishable patterns among them.  
Knowing the schools' characteristics is useful for two reasons.  First, one can learn which policy
innovations seem promising to the leaders of urban schools who have the power to select their policies. 
Second, different charter schools have different effects on achievement.  Later in this article, we attempt
to see which characteristics are associated with more positive effects on achievement.
About 91 percent of charter school students attend schools that require uniforms, about 95 percent
attend schools that voluntarily administer standardized exams on a regular basis for diagnosis purposes. 
Exams such Terra Nova, the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, and the Stanford 9 are administered to track
progress and identify students in need of different instruction.  (All charter schools also administer the
standardized exams required by the state of New York.)  The advisory system is used by nearly all the
charter schools that serve middle or high school grades. In an advisory system, a teacher or pair of
teachers is assigned to a group of students for an entire school year.  Teachers meet frequently (often10
  We did not require that a school use terminology like "No Broken Windows" to classify it as
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having this disciplinary strategy, but we may nonetheless have understated the share of schools that have
the strategy.  This is because disciplinary strategies are often described in terms that are too vague to
allow. 
daily) with their students and are responsible for tracking their progress and preventing them from
"falling through the cracks."  Because students in elementary grades are assigned to one teacher for most
of the school day, advisory systems would be duplicative and are therefore not used by elementary
schools.
About 64 percent of students attend a charter school with a school year of 190 days or longer, and
20 percent attend a school with a school year of 200 days or longer. The modal school year in the United
States is 180 days or 36 weeks.  About 55 percent of students attend a charter school with a day that last
eight hours or longer, 67 percent attend one with an optional after-school program, and about 57 percent
attend one with Saturday school that is mandatory for all or at least some students (for instance, students
who are struggling academically).  54 percent of students have an extended English or Language Arts
period of over 90 minutes, and the same percentage have an extended math period of 90 minutes or more. 
While 90 minutes is the length of the "literacy block" mandated for elementary school grades by the
Children First initiative in New York City, traditional public elementary schools in New York City are
required to have between 60 and 75 minutes of math instruction daily, depending on the grade.
About 52 percent of students attend charter schools that ask their parents to sign "contracts."
Because the contracts are not enforceable as contracts, it is best to think of them as method of trying to
ensure that parents know about the school's policies and expectations.  Some parents may also feel
morally bound to abide by the contract.  52 percent of students attend a charter school that reserves one or
more seats on its board for parents.  About 21 percent attend one with a disciplinary policy that fits the
"No Broken Windows" school of thinking which holds that small courtesies and punishing small
infractions (usually at classroom level) are important.  This is in contrast to disciplinary strategies that
focus more on preventing or punishing large infractions (often at an administrative level above the
classroom).
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The charter schools employ a variety of math and reading curriculum with no dominant
curriculum.  The most popular are Saxon Math (41 percent of students) and Core Knowledge (38 percent
of students.)  See the appendix for descriptions of some of the curricula used by multiple charter schools. 
About 49 percent of students attend a charter school that has a system of bonuses for successful
teachers.  Finally, 17 percent of students attend a charter school whose teachers are unionized. 
Unfortunately, the variation in unionization is not as useful as one might think.  The problem is that the11
  For instance, the conversion charter schools have all operating longer--in some cases, much
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longer--than the other charter schools.  Some conversion charter schools still have students enrolled who
applied (or whose siblings applied, giving them priority) in the days before they used only lotteries for
admission.  See footnote 4 (X).
  For students who did not match on the basis of a unique identification number, such as a Social
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Security or OSIS number, match keys were used as follows:  (i) last name, first name, date of birth with
various versions of the names (abbreviations, alternative spellings, and so on); (ii) last name, first name,
and various likely permutations of the date of birth (most often the month and day reversed since
Americans are fairly unique in putting the month before the day); (iii) last name, first name, prior school,
and prior grade with various likely adjustments to prior grade; (iv) name, date of birth, and prior grade;
(v) telephone number and alternative telephone number.  Once these match keys had been run, an
applicant might be matched to multiple possible records.  All of the likely matches were checked by hand,
bringing to bear all available variables simultaneously.  Knowledge of common abbreviations, spelling
mistakes, and similar issues was also applied in the hand check.  For instance, two possible matches might
be differentiated based on the student's home address or his parents' names.
five conversion schools dominate the unionized group, and this makes it hard to tell unionization apart
from conversion, which comes with a variety of other special circumstances.   In future reports, we plan
7
to include teacher certification and experience data that are not available on consistent basis for this year's
report.
III. Data
Most of the data used in the study are derived from the administrative database of New York
City's Department of Education (the "New York City Basic Educational Data System").  This database
includes all students who attend New York City's traditional public schools and all students who attend
New York City's charter schools.
The procedure for our data assembly is as follows.  Each spring, charter schools review the
applications (typically a single page with fill-ins) they have received, put the applications into lotteries if
the school is oversubscribed, and hold their admissions lotteries.  We ensure that the data from each
student's application is sent to the New York City Department of Education.   A typical applicant's data
would include his name, birth date, parents' or guardians' names, address, telephone number, and the
grade to which he is applying (usually, but not always, the grade he is attending plus one).  Additional
data that are sent if available include the student's current school, his social security number, and his
identification number in the New York City Department of Education (the "OSIS number").  Of course,
some students' applications are incomplete or hard to decipher, and the student's data are then missing one
or more elements, such as a telephone number.  The data are matched to the Department's database by a
contractor for the department using the maximum amount of information possible.   Application data that
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matched to more than one possible record in the database were checked by hand to determine which of
the possible matches was correct.  Once an applicant had been matched to his record in the database,
information was extracted on his characteristics; enrollment; attendance; test scores, and certification for
and participation in various programs such as free and reduced-price lunch, special education, and
English language services.  This information was gathered both from the years prior to his applying to a
charter school and from the years after his applying.  We were able to obtain test score data from 2000-01
to 2005-06 for this year's report.  When the information had been gathered, it was sent to us with a
masked or encrypted student identification number.
A.  Match Rates
When this study commenced, we advised schools on the variables that we would like to see on
their applications because they would be useful for matching.  We obtained application data from spring
2005 from all of the schools covered by this year's report, and we requested earlier years' application data
as well.  Because schools had not been aware that these earlier years' application data would later be
useful, not all schools had archived it or had requested all of the elements that would prove helpful in
matching on their applications.  Therefore, the 2005-06 application data have the most complete coverage
of schools and the most information on which to match.  Previous years' application data are less ideal on
both dimensions.  Going forward with applications in spring 2006, spring 2007, and so on, we have
already obtained or expect application data at least as good as the 2005-06 data.
We should not achieve a match rate of 100 percent because applicants who were not attending a
New York City public school at the time they applied and who did not subsequently attend one should not
have matched to a record in the database.  Such applicants include children applying for kindergarten who
subsequently attend a private school, enroll in a public school outside the district, or engage in home
schooling.  Such applicants also include children who were attending a private school, another district's
schools, or home schooling when they applied and who continued to attend such a school.  Note that
students can apply to a New York City charter school from outside the district so long as they reside in
the district at the time they actually commence attending the school.  To determine what match rate we
ought to achieve, we computed the percentages of applicants who reported, at the time they applied,
attending a private school (14 percent), engaging in home school (less than 1 percent), and living in
another district (less than 1 percent).  Unfortunately, the first computation does not help with students
who are applying to kindergarten, the single most common grade for applicants.  Moreover, there are a
large number of private kindergartens in New York that are not connected to a full array of elementary13
  Specifically, using the combined 5 percent and 1 percent samples from the 2000 Integrated
9
Public Use Microdata (Ruggles, 2007), we computed the probability of attending a private school for each
gender-by-race or ethnicity-by-free or reduced-price lunch cell.  We then associated those probabilities
with each applicant based on the applicant's cell.  The resulting average probability among the applicants
is what we provide in the text.
  See notes to the table for further detail.
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grades, and we are concerned that students who apply to a first grade from a private kindergarten might
not be able to continue in private school.  Thus, we also use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples
from the 2000 Census to compute the percentage of New York City students who attend private school: 
10.6 percent.  To make this computation, we re-weighted the students in the Census data so that they had
the gender, race, ethnicity, and poverty composition of the applicant pool.
9
In short, although we hope to match all applicants who have a record in the Department's
database to their records, we believe that we should be able to match only about 90 percent of students,
plus or minus a few percent. There is some variation among charter schools in their ideal match rates
because some schools attract  more applicants from private schools and so on.
The match rate for spring 2005 applications was 90.8 percent.  Recall that this is the year for
which we had the highest quality application data.  The match rates for spring 2004 and spring 2003 were
88.4 and 88.7 percent, respectively.  The match rate falls to about 81 for spring 2002 and 2001
applications, but is 88 percent for spring 2000 applications.  The relatively high match rate for spring
2000, despite its being an early year, is related to the fact that many of that year's applications were made
to conversion schools which had full access to the database when they were processing and/or archiving
application data.  For full details on the match rate, see Table 5, which also shows that an extremely high
percentage of students who have ever attended a New York City charter school are included in the study. 
Over all the years available, the percentage is 97 percent.
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B.  Substantial Problems in the Recording of Special Education and English Language Learner Status and
Minor Problems in the Recording of Other Classification Variables
There are problems in the recording of special education and English Language Learner status in
the database we use in this report.  The problems can lead to very substantial underestimates of disability
and the need for English language learning in charter schools.
Consider special education first.  According to our understanding, which is based on
communications with the New York City Department of Education and the New York City Center for14
  For help in understanding these problems, we are particularly grateful to Jennifer Bell-
11
Ellwanger, Senior Instructional Manager, Office of Assessment and Accountability, New York City
Department of Education and to Arthur Sadoff, Special Education Consultant to the New York City
Center on Charter School Excellence.
Charter School Excellence, there are three main problems that occur.   A school that refers a student for
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special education must work with the Committee on Special Education to get him formally identified, and
some charter schools have experienced significant delays getting this done.  The charter schools have
little control over the timing because the Committee on Special Education is the responsibility of the host
district--in this case, New York City. Students can sit in the referral queue for extended periods, and so
long as they are there, they are not recorded as having special needs.  Second, even when a student has
been formally identified, a subsystem of the New York City database known as CAPS must be updated to
reflect the student's designation.  Traditional public schools have direct access to CAPS, but most charter
schools can get entries updated only by working through the Committee on Special Education or through
a third party contractor.  Not only can there be delays and problems in the updating of a student's
designation, but the system must also be updated to show that a student has moved into a charter school. 
Apparently, this second update is sometimes overlooked, with the result that student's special education
status is not attributed to the charter school.  Third, although there is a "flag" for special education in the
main part of the database system known as ATS, charter schools are only required to maintain students'
enrollment and other basic information in ATS.  This is because many charter schools use another student
information system as their primary system.  In contrast, ATS is the primary student information for
traditional public schools, which are required to maintain not only their basic information but also flags
like the special education flag.  When a charter school leaves the special education flag blank, the system
appears to produce the answer that no students are in special education when, in reality, the system simply
contains no information on the question.  In other words, missing data are not differentiable from "zeros"
(students' non-participation in special education).
In short, there are three important problems with the recording of charter school students' need for
special education, and all three problems cause under-reporting.  When we compare the percentage of
special education students in charter schools that we compute from the data extracted for us from the
database to the offical state count (8.90 percent), the official count is more than three times our count. 
This is a such a large discrepancy that, at present, we cannot use the database numbers to make
comparisons between students in charter schools and students in traditional public schools.  However, we
do show statistics based on the pre-lottery designations of students who apply to charter schools while15
  The source is authors' conversations with charter school leaders regarding differences between
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race and ethnicity as parents wrote it on applications and race and ethnicity as shown in the Department's
database.
  The rule for the standard federal classification is that Hispanic ethnicity "trumps" race so that
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the categories are black non-Hispanic, white non-Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander, Native American,
Hispanic, and unknown or none of the above.  School staff report, however, that it appears to them that
the rule is not always applied so that a parent, say, who checks the black and Hispanic boxes may have
his child classified as black.
they are in the traditional public schools.  As we shall see, pre-lottery designations have their own
problems but they are much less severe because all of the recording is done through the traditional public
school system.
The recording of a student's status as an English Language Learner status is also problematic for
charter schools.  There is a "flag" for English Language Learners in the ATS part of the database system,
but--like the flag for special education--charter schools are not required to maintain it and may leave it
blank for all students.  The system then appears to produce the answer that no students are English
Language Learners when, in reality, the system simply contains no information on the question.  This
problem may be exacerbated by the fact that charter schools receive only a fraction of the compensation
for English Language Learners that traditional public schools receive.  This gives them little incentive to
fill in the flag.  When we compare the percentage of English Language Learners in charter schools
recorded in the database to the offical state count (2.80 percent), the official count is more than twice the
database count.  This also is such a large discrepancy that the database numbers cannot be used to make
comparisons between students in charter schools and students in traditional public schools.  We do show
statistics based on pre-lottery designations, but these have their own problems (see below).
Some of the same problems (recording delays, ATS flags not filled in) exist for the recording of
students who have been certified for the National School Lunch Program.  Charter schools' numbers are
understated as a result, especially for new entrants.  We estimate the magnitude of the understatement to
be about 8 percentage points.  Finally, charter schools report that they find it hard to correct the database
when it shows a student's race and ethnicity as being different than what the school knows the student's
self-identification to be.   The latter problem appears mainly to affect students whose parents check
12
multiple boxes for race and ethnicity.
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C.  New York State Tests
All students in the traditional public schools and charter schools take the New York State
examinations in reading and math in all of grades three through eight.  They also take (and may retake)16
  The website of the Office of State Assessment in the New York State Education Department
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includes examination scoring information, score conversion charts, manuals and technical reports on the
tests, test samplers, and tests that have been released.  See http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/osa/ (accessed
June 2007). 
the New York State Regents Examinations in several subjects.  The Regents Examinations are offered in
January, June and August, and a student need not take tests on a specific schedule.  However, to earn a
high school diploma, a student must pass exams in Living Environment (biology), Mathematics, Global
History, Comprehensive English, and U.S. History.  It is recommended that students take Living
Environment in grade nine, Math A in grade ten, Global History in grade ten, Comprehensive English in
grade eleven, and United States History in grade eleven.  Scores from all New York State tests are sent to
the New York City Department of Education and transferred into its database.  It is our understanding that
there are no differences, therefore, in how scores get recorded for charter and traditional public school
students.
The tests for grades three through eight are given scale scores and there is an official mapping
between the scale scores and New York State's four performance levels.  See Appendix Figures 1 and 2
for the 2005-06 mapping for math and reading.  Throughout our analysis, we use standard or Z scores--
that is, scale scores that have been first demeaned and then divided by the standard deviation.  We use the
means and standard deviations for all New York City students in the relevant year and subject.  Purely to
provide context, we translate a few effects based on standard scores back into scale scores or
"performance levels."  When we do this, we use the 2005-06 translations.  A great deal of information
about New York State's tests is available from the Office of State Assessment.
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D.  Differences between the Truth and Proxies for Poverty, Disability, and the Lack of proficiency in
English
Researchers who rely on administrative data, as we do, do not directly measure poverty,
disability, or the lack of proficiency in English.  Instead, we use proxies such as certification for the
National School Lunch Program , participation in special education, and classification as an English
Language Learner.  Here a problem arises (in addition to the already described recording problems)
because the proxies are measures of treatment, not measures of a child's needs.  If we use data on these
proxies from a student's current school, the comparison between charter school applicants and other
public school students is unreliable. The unreliability stems from differences in the ways charter schools
and traditional public schools certify students for free and reduced-price lunch and treat students who
have learning problems or a lack of proficiency in English.
For example, consider free and reduced-price lunch eligibility.  In order to certify a child for the17
  See, for instance, Burghardt and Hulsey (2004) and United States Department of Agriculture
15
(2003).
  Most large school districts currently use direct certification for students whose parents claim to
16
be participants in a means-tested program such as Temporary Aid for Needy Families.  Such parents are
asked to bring recent documents relating to their program participation and these are checked against state
social insurance records. 
program, a school must get his parents to must document their household's income and composition
(adults, dependent children, other dependents, and so on). Certifying parents is a sufficiently challenging
task that federal studies regularly find that some schools certify students who are not really eligible and
that other schools fail to certify students who are really eligible.   Schools vary in how they describe
15
program eligibility and documentation requirements, whether they use direct certification, and whether
they encourage parents whose applications are rejected or whose certification is terminated to reapply.  
16
The matter is complicated by the fact that schools can provide a schoolwide lunch program if they certify
a sufficient share of their students. Thus, the same administrator who is aggressive about certifying
students when he is at a school that is just shy of the threshold for a schoolwide program may be
unaggressive when he is at a school that has already passed the threshold. Charter schools are, for the
purpose of federal programs, independent Local Education Agencies that conduct their own processes of
certifying students and may choose not to offer a federal lunch program at all. Numerous small school
districts in the United States do not participate in the federal program owing to the fact that the paperwork
involved is considerable but the subsidy is small for small districts because it is on a strictly per-pupil
basis.
Problems arise with special education and English Language Learner classification because for
every student who is profoundly disabled or profoundly incapable in English, there are many students
whose classification is close to the margin in the sense that, properly implemented, either a mainstream or
a specialized experience could suit the student's needs well.  A small school, including a charter school,
may be more likely to offer a marginal student a student a mainstream classroom experience--thereby not
classifying him--than would a large school that already has extensive programming for disabled and
English Language Learner students.  In fact, Cullen and Rivkin (2003) report that some families apply to
charter schools in a deliberate attempt to change the status of their marginally classified child.
In short, we expect charter schools and traditional public schools faced with identical students to
display variation in the proxies for poverty, disability, and the lack of proficiency in English.  We can
partially address the resulting problem (and the already described recording problem) by focusing on the
value of a student's proxies at the time he applied rather than at the current time.  For students who were18
in the traditional public schools at the time they applied, this procedure improves the reliability of
comparisons owing to the fact that the same Local Education Agency is classifying all the students.  In
particular, this procedure should greatly improve the reliability of a comparison between two applicants
who are in the same lottery and who previously attended similar traditional public schools. 
Unfortunately, time-of-application comparisons are not informative for more than 50 percent of charter
school applicants because they have no classification history when they apply.  The vast majority of the
students without a history are applicants to kindergarten or first grade (who together make up almost 50
percent of all applicants; see Table 2) but there are also applicants from private schools, home schooling,
and schools outside the district.
E.  Attrition
A student attrits from the study if his family moves out of the district, he begins attending private
school, or he begins home schooling.  Because of errors in the database, a student might also attrit in
practical terms when he does not actually leave the public school sector in New York City.  This can
happen if he moves to a new school within the district and his information is entered differently so that
his old and new records do not match up.  A student is not counted as an attritor if he graduates from high
school.
Apart from considerations of power, attrition is not a problem for studies of this kind if it is
random.  Attrition is a problem when it is substantial, systematically related to students' characteristics,
and systematically related to whether a student is lotteried-in or lotteried-out.  For instance, if low
achieving applicants and high achieving lotteried-in applicants stayed in the data but high achieving
lotteried-out applicants attrited with a 10 percent probability, the lotteried-out group would systematically
lose a portion of its high achievers while lotteried-in group would keep its high achievers.
Fortunately, the attrition rates in this study are so far extremely low.  Among all applicants, only
0.12 percent of those who have enrolled in charter schools have attrited, and the attrition rate is just 0.02
percent lower for applicants who have not enrolled. Only 0.15 percent of those who were lotteried-in have
attrited, and the rate is only 0.11 percent lower for the lotteried-out.  See Table 6, which also shows that
there are not statistically significant differences at the 95 percent level between enrolled and not enrolled
or between lotteried-in and lotteried-out in any subgroup of applicants:  female, black, Hispanic, white,
Asian, other race, certified for free or reduced price lunch, participants in special education, English
Language Learners.  All of these subgroups have attrition rates below 1 percent.
We believe that the very low attrition rates are due, in part, to the fact that New York City is a
massive district and that the charter school applicants tend to be disadvantaged.  A student can move quite
far among the five boroughs and remain in the district.  Applicants are unlikely to move to the suburbs19
  We are attempting to get even more complete attendance records that will allow us to allocate
17
partial years more precisely, but specification tests suggest that varying our approximations a reasonable
amount does not make a difference to any results.  The vast majority of students switch schools between
school years.
outside the City because housing in the suburbs is mostly outside their families' price range.  Moreover,
the study is still young.  In many cases, we are using data on a student from just one, two, or three years
after he has applied.  Even if he is going to attrit eventually, he might very well not have attrited yet.  We
show a specification test for the effects of attrition below, and we will monitor attrition closely in future
reports.
F.  Miscellaneous Data Issues
We observe students' October, March, and June records, the last being the official year end
record.  Thus, a student who transfers in the middle of the school year between schools will have each
school assigned its portion of the year, at least approximately.   Also, variables such as the time elapsed
17
since a student starting attended a charter school are recorded in partial years when appropriate.
Finally, to provide background information, we use data from published reports of the New York
City Department of Education (various dates), published Summary File C of the 2000 Census of
Population and Housing (2002), and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples from the same Census
(Ruggles, 2007).
IV. The Students who Apply to New York City's Charter Schools
In this section, we would like to be able to compare the charter schools' applicants to public
school students, both in New York City overall and in the specific traditional public schools from which
the charter schools draw students.  Unfortunately, it turns that most such comparisons cannot be made in a
way that is reliable or easily interpretable.  Only comparisons based on characteristics of students that are
fixed over time and easily measurable turn out to reliable.
A.  Comparisons of applicants to others on the basis of gender, race and ethnicity
The characteristics that are most fixed and most easily measurable are gender, race, and ethnicity.
We have already mentioned that there are may be some problems with race and ethnicity because charter
schools do not directly enter their data into the database and are concerned that mixed-race or mixed
ethnicity children sometimes get recorded incorrectly.  Subject to this caveat, Table 7 shows gender, race,
and ethnicity variables for charter school applicants, a composite comparison school, and all traditional
New York City public school students.  The composite comparison school is a weighted average of the20
  See notes to the table for details on how we treat the composite comparison school's numbers
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for the purpose of testing for statistical significance.
characteristics of all of the traditional public schools from which the charter schools draw applicants.  For
instance, if the fourth grade cohorts in traditional public schools A and B account for, respectively, 0.3
percent and 0.2 percent of the applicants, the gender ratios of these cohorts will get weights of 0.03 and
0.02 when we create the composite comparison school's gender ratio.  (A cohort is all students who attend
a certain grade in a certain school in a certain year.)
Table 7 shows that about 48 percent of charter school applicants are female, about 50 percent of
students in composite comparison schools are female, and about 49 percent of all New York City
traditional public school students are female.  The differences between these percentages are too small to
be interesting even though they statistically significant, owing to the large number of applicant
observations.
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Table 7 also shows that, on the basis of being white non-Hispanic, Asian, and other race or
ethnicity, charter school applicants appear very similar to students in the composite comparison schools. 
The differences, though statistically significance in some cases, are too small to be interesting--especially
in light of the data recording issues already mentioned.  For instance, about 3.3 percent of 2005-06
applicants and about 2.3 percent of composite comparison school students are Asian.  However, neither
the applicants nor the composite comparison school are similar to New York City's population of public
school students, 14 of whom are white and 14 percent of whom are Asian.
The composite comparison school (for the 2005-06 applicants) is about 50 percent black and
about 45 percent Hispanic.  This makes it both more black and more Hispanic than New York City's
population of public school students (32 black and 39 percent Hispanic).  This also makes it clear that the
charter schools draw from a population where the vast majority of students (95 percent) are either black
or Hispanic.  In consequence, if a school disproportionately attracts black applicants, it will almost
mechanically disproportionately not attract Hispanic students, and vice versa.  People often find this
mechanical relationship confusing because they are accustomed to thinking about a school being more
minority and less white.  The bottom line is that when we say that a charter school is more black, we are
also saying that it is less Hispanic, and these are not two separate findings but two ways of stating the
same finding.
Table 7 shows that 64 percent of charter school applicants are black.  Compare this to the 50
percent of composite comparison school students and 32 percent of New York City public school students
who are black.  There is an approximately equal and opposite disproportionality for Hispanic students:  2721
  In both the New York City traditional public schools and in charter schools located in areas
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with a significant Hispanic population, key materials (such as applications, school calendars, and brief
school descriptions) are usually available in Spanish but many non-key materials (such as school
newsletters and longer program descriptions) are not.  We are thus inclined not to attribute the
disproportionate draw of charter schools to language proficiency alone but to an interaction between
language proficiency and an inclination to accept the default.  That is, if a parent finds it equally
challenging to learn in depth about his local traditional public school and his local charter school, he may
be inclined to choose the default school.
percent of applicants are Hispanic but composite comparison schools are 45 percent Hispanic.  One
explanation of the disproportionate draw of charter schools among black students is that the authorizers
have approved some schools that are named after a black person (Harriet Tubman, Sisulu Walker) or
associated with a community organization with long-established ties to the black community (Harlem
Children's Zone).  However, the disproportionate draw is much wider than these schools, suggesting that
policies that are common among charter schools but uncommon among traditional public schools may
appeal more to black families (less to Hispanic families).  Alternatively, Hispanic families may simply
like their children's traditional public schools better or be more inclined to accept their traditional public
school as the one that authorities have assigned them.
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B.  Comparisons of applicants to others on the basis of proxies for poverty, disability, and lack of
proficiency in English
We have already mentioned that the proxies for poverty, disability, and lack of proficiency in
English are problematic because (i) they are measures of treatment, not circumstances, and charter and
traditional public schools may treat marginal students differently; (ii) charter schools' information is
recorded with substantial understatement; and (iii) the proxies are available at the time of application for
only a share of applicants.
Unfortunately, the applicants for whom time-of-application proxies are available are not 
representative of the applicant pool.  This is shown in the top panel of Table 8 where a comparison is
made between the intended grade of entry, gender, race, and ethnicity information of applicants who do
and do not have time-of-application proxies available.  Intended grade, gender, and so on have limited
value as indicators of whether the two groups are similar on poverty, disability, and proficiency in
English, but they are the only indicators available.  Nevertheless, each of the indicators is statistically
significantly different for the two groups and some of group differences are substantial in magnitude:  the
average grade of intended entry is 3.7 for students with time-of-application proxies but only 1.9 for
students without them.  About 32 percent of students with time-of-application proxies are Hispanic but
only 23 percent of students without them are.22
Unfortunately, there is a further problem.  When we come to construct the composite comparison
school, we cannot do so in as exact a way as we did for gender, race, and ethnicity.  The reason is that the
proxies are available only at the school level, not the school-by-grade level, for traditional public schools. 
As a result, the applicants and the composite comparison school have different grade compositions in
Table 8.  Since students take time to get classified, differences in grade compositions cause
incomparability.  We can partial solve the problem by re-weighting the charter school applicants so that
their grade composition looks like that of the traditional public schools (essentially down-weighting
applicants to low grades and up-weighting applicants to higher grades).  This only partially solves the
problem because applicants to higher grades, who apply only after having experienced the traditional
public schools and presumably not found a perfect fit, are fundamentally somewhat different than
applicants to lower grades.  In short, there four independent reasons to believe that comparisons of the
proxies between the charter schools and traditional public schools are problematic and must be interpreted
with caution.
The bottom panel of Table 8 shows that, at the time they apply, 91.1 percent of charter school
applicants are certified for free or reduced-price lunch.  If we adjust this number so that the applicants
have the same grade composition as the traditional public schools, it becomes 93.0.   86.6 percent of
composite comparison school students are certified for free or reduced-price lunch and the parallel
number for the New York City traditional public schools is 73.6 percent.  In summary, on free and
reduced-price lunch certification, applicants are fairly similar to the traditional public schools from which
the charter schools draw (we cannot say more with any confidence) but the applicants are almost certainly
poorer than average student in New York City.  The certification difference of 17 to 19 percentage points
is so large that it is implausible that correcting the multiple measurement problems would change its sign.
Table 8 also shows that, at the time they apply, 8.1 percent of charter school applicants participate
in special education.  If we adjust this number so that the applicants have the same grade composition as
the traditional public schools, it becomes 11.1.  This number is close to the composite comparison
school's number (11.5) and the New York City number (12.6), and thus it appears that applicants are
fairly similar to the traditional public schools from which the charter schools draw and to New York City
overall.  We cannot say more with any confidence given the multiple measurement problems.
Finally, Table 8 shows that, at the time they apply, 2.6 percent of charter school applicants are
classified as English Language Learners.  If we adjust this number so that the applicants have the same
grade composition as the traditional public schools, it becomes 4.2.  13.7 percent of composite
comparison school students and 13.6 percent of New York City students are English Language Learners. 
Because even our most comparable number (4.2 percent) is still not representative of charter school23
applicants, we hesitate to conclude that charter schools appeal disproportionately to students who are
proficient in English.  However, we believe that evidence that reinforces this conclusion comes from the
disproportionate appeal of charter school to black students who are more likely to be native English
speakers than Hispanic students.
C.  Comparisons of applicants to others on the basis of prior test scores
Table 9 has the approximately the same format as Table 8, but it shows applicants' test scores
from prior to their attending a charter school or staying in the traditional public schools.  In other words,
it is an attempt to provide an answer to the question of whether charter schools disproportionately draw
low or high achievers.  Unfortunately, the non-representativeness of applicants with prior test scores is far
worse than the non-representativeness of applicants with time-of-application proxies.  Only 36 percent of
charter school applicants have prior test scores recorded because, given the lack of testing before third
grade, a student must be applying to the fourth grade or a high grade in order to have been tested.
The top panel of Table 9 shows that this 36 percent of applicants are highly non-representative. 
The indicators (intended grade of entry, gender, race, and ethnicity) have their limitations, but they are
nevertheless telling.  All but one of the indicators are statistically significantly different for the students
with and without prior test scores, and some of the group differences are very large in magnitude.  Among
students with prior test scores, about 56 percent are black and 37 percent are Hispanic.  Among students
without prior scores, 66 percent are black and 24 percent are Hispanic.  Much more important, the
average grade of intended entry is 5.7 for students with prior test scores but only 1.9 for students without
them.  This nearly four year difference in grade of entry is a serious problem because it means that the
typical student with prior test scores has considerable experience in the traditional public schools when he 
decides to apply to a charter school.  It is likely that he does not fit well in the traditional public schools
but we do not know in what way.  He might be less motivated than his classmates, more motivated, on an
unexpectedly bad growth trajectory, on an unexpectedly good one. We can be fairly sure that these late
grade applicants are not a random sample from their traditional public schools.  In contrast, the applicants
without prior test scores are so young that their parents have little information on which to decide that
they do or do not fit well in the traditional public schools.  Thus, it is reasonably likely that they are a
random draw from their traditional public schools.  In short, it is simply impossible to extrapolate from
the applicants with prior test scores in order to make reasonably precise comparisons between the prior
test scores of the average charter school applicant and the average New York City public school student.
The bottom half of Table 9 shows prior test scores for what they are worth.  The scores are in
standard score form and the scores for the composite comparison school and New York City public
schools overall are from 2004-05 since this is the modal prior year for applicants.  All of the standard24
scores for New York City overall are zero since the scores are standardized on the city-wide mean and
standard deviation.  Among charter school applicants who have prior test scores, the average standard
scores in math are -0.10 in grade three, 0.02 in grade four, -0.01 in grade five, -0.004 in grade six, -0.25 in
grade seven, and -0.001 in grade eight.  The reading scores are similar.  Composite comparison school
students have average standard scores in math of -0.34 in grade three, -0.24 in grade four, -0.31 in grade
five, -0.13 in grade six, -0.20 in grade seven, and -0.25 in grade eight.  The reading scores are similar. In
other words, the average composite comparison school student has lower scores than the average New
York City student, but we have no way of comparing the average charter school applicant to the average
composite comparison school student.
V.  Empirical Methodology for the Lottery-Based Analysis of Achievement
In the previous section, we described numerous problems that make it hard to compare charter
applicants to other students in the traditional public schools.  None of these problems affect the
achievement analysis that we now describe because the analysis is based entirely on applicants.  The
essential strategy is a comparison of students who are lotteried-in and lotteried-out of charter schools
using instrumental variables regression.  This strategy is fairly well known, so we will focus on aspects of
it that are interesting in this application.
A.  Randomization and balanced lotteries
Unlike some randomized studies in which there is one lottery that determines treatment or control
status, there are 725 lotteries in our data.  This is because, each year, each school holds a lottery for each
grade in which it has space but is oversubscribed.  Assignment is random within a lottery but a student’s
decision to participate in a certain lottery is non-random.  In order to make use of all the within-lottery
randomness and none of the between-lottery non-randomness, we include lottery fixed effects in all
regressions.
The logic of randomization is that, owing to the law of large numbers, the average lotteried-in
and lotteried-out students should not only be comparable on observable characteristics but also on
unobservable ones.  We hypothesize that lotteries that are balanced on the basis of students’ observable
characteristics are also more to be balanced on the basis of their unobservable characteristics.  For this
reason, we test each lottery for balance on the observable covariates prior to including it in the analysis. 
This is a conservative assumption in that we are relying solely on the within-lottery randomization and25
  If each of our lotteries was an independent draw from the same population, we would rely
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equally on balanced and unbalanced lotteries.  We are not confident making such an assumption,
however.
not the tendency of one unbalanced lottery to offset another across lotteries.   Although results based
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only the balanced lotteries are the most credible, we also show results based on all lotteries as a
specification test.
To test for balance, we use Hotelling’s T  test, which is the analog to the t-test when multiple
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variables are considered simultaneously.  We use all available pre-determined student characteristics:
gender, race, ethnicity, certification for free and reduced-lunch at the time of application, participation in
special education at the time of application, classification as an English Language Learner at the time of
application, and prior test scores.  We use the classic fix of setting these variables equal to zero when they
are missing and including an indicator for their being missing.   Thus, we are also testing whether the
lotteried-in and lotteried-out are balanced on having missing data.
B.  Students with slightly complex lottery participation
Some students participate in multiple lotteries and are lotteried-in at one school and lotteried-out
at the others.  For this overall analysis, we treat such students as having been lotteried-in at the school at
which they enroll and keep them as lotteried-out students in the other schools’ lotteries only for the
purpose of testing balance.  We do not treat them, post-lottery, as though they had been lotteried-out of
those other schools and were attending traditional public schools as a result.  Some students participate in
multiple lotteries and are lotteried-out of all of them.  They may therefore serve as controls for treated
students in more than one lottery.  To account for this phenomenon, we estimate robust standard errors
clustered at the student level (as opposed to the application level).
If a student applies to a charter school and has a sibling already enrolled at that charter school, he
is given a place in the grade to which he applies if there is space.  That is, he is placed ahead of the
lottery.  (This is standard treatment for siblings in many magnet, intra-district choice, and desegregation
programs.)  If a larger number of siblings applies than there are places, a lottery is run among the siblings.
As a practical matter, this does not occur in intake grades but does occasionally occur in non-intake
grades where the number of vacancies can be very small.  We treat a student who is admitted on the basis
of his sibling’s enrollment as having been lotteried-in with his sibling–that is, he counted as lotteried-in. 
If a student has a sibling and participated in an all sibling lottery, he is lotteried-in if he was lotteried-in in
that lottery and lotteried-out otherwise. We show a specification test for siblings below, and logic26
  Suppose that a family decides that it is interested in a charter school and puts their oldest child
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in a lottery.  If he is lotteried-in, so in all likelihood are all of his younger siblings as long as they apply to
the intake grade.  Suppose that if he is lotteried-out, the family does not have the younger siblings apply
when they reach the relevant age because the oldest child is already installed in a traditional public school
and the family wants to keep the children together.  This scenario would not pose a problem for the study. 
Alternatively, suppose that even though their oldest child is lotteried-out, the family continues to
enter younger siblings in lotteries when they reach the relevant age.  Also, suppose that if a younger
sibling gets lotteried-in, the older sibling(s) will then use sibling priority in the following year to enroll in
the charter school if their non-intake grades have space.  This scenario could be a problem for the study
because it gives larger families "more bites at the apple".  Then, if family size were correlated with
outcomes, that correlation could be confounded with the charter school effect.  Family size is generally
found to be negatively correlated with student achievement so we would expect the problem to bias
downward the estimated effect of charter schools on achievement.
suggests that sibling priorities would, if anything, slightly depress the estimated charter school effect.  
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C.  Treatment, the intention-to-treat, and the localness of the average treatment effect
In our analysis, the treatment variable is the number of years that a student has been enrolled in a
charter school.  This is the most natural treatment variable but it does assume that the effect is a function
of the length of the treatment, as opposed to the mere fact of treatment (a one-time effect of enrolling in a
charter school).  We plan, in future reports, to show specification tests that allow the treatment variable to
enter non-linearly so that if the effect of charter schools first increased (decreased) with time elapsed and
then hit a plateau, we might see this.  Unfortunately, we do not yet have sufficient variation in time
elapsed for such tests.  Among the observations that are useful for estimation (see below), almost 40
percent are for a student's first post-lottery year, 27 percent are for a student's second post-lottery, 19
percent are for a student's third post-lottery year, and the remainder are spread thinly over the fourth
through the sixth post-lottery years.
The intention to treat variable is the number of years that a student would have spent in charter
school if he complied fully with assignment based on the lottery.  That is, for a student who is lotteried-in,
the clock starts ticking with the fall of the school year in which he could enter a charter school and it
continues ticking until such time as he would have reached the charter school’s final grade.
We instrument for the treatment variable with the intention to treat variable to obtain a treatment
on the treated effect.  As is well known, the resulting estimator is local to the type of student who is a
complier–that is, students who, when offered a place in a charter school, enroll.  In some applications,
having an estimator that is local to compliers is problematic because we would like to be able to think
about the effect that treatment would have if it were extended to those who would be non-compliant.  In
the case of charter schools, however, an estimate that is local to compliers is exactly what we want.  It is
part of the whole charter school idea that only students who want to charter schools should attend them. 27
  The list is given in the text in the discussion of the Hotelling T  test for balance.
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What we want to be to do is extrapolate the results to other students who, like the compliers, want to
attend charter schools and have needs similar to those of the students who apply to New York City charter
schools now.  We would argue against the extrapolation of the results to, for instance, students who are
from affluent white or Asian households with two parents who live in an advantaged neighborhood.
In most randomized assignment studies, there are two types of non-compliance: students can
decline the opportunity to enroll in a charter school even though they are offered a place (“decliners”) and
students enroll in a charter school even though they are not offered a place (“defiers”).  There are no
defiers in our study so far as we know.  That is, there should not be and we do not observe any student
attending a charter school who was reported as having been lotteried-out.  We do observe decliners and it
is precisely to account for them that we use instrumental variables to estimate the treatment on the treated
effect.  We show some data below to investigate the question of how decliners compare to compliers and
the lotteried-out.
D.  The estimating equations
In summary, the implied second stage of our basic instrumental variables procedure is
, (1)
where   is the year t achievement (standard score) of student i who participated in lottery j; 
is his time spent in charter school by year t; the vector   contains the set of pre-determined covariates
that describe student i, , the vector   is an exhaustive set of lottery fixed effects (note the lack of another
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constant),   is a set of grade-of-test fixed effects, and   is a set of school year fixed effects,
 is the observation level error term, and   reminds us of the robust standard errors clustered at the
student level.  Note that the grade-of-test and school year fixed effects are nearly superfluous because the
test scores are standardized already using the grade-by-year specific means and standard deviations.  The
The implied second stage of the instrumental variables procedure is
, (2)
where   is the intention-to-treat variable defined above,   and   are error terms
parallel to those in the implied second stage, and all other variables are as defined above.
E.  A comment on alternative methods of assessing charter school students' test scores
In Hoxby and Murarka (2007), we consider methods other than lottery-based methods of28
  There is an enormous literature on this problem, but a seminal paper that is very useful for
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thinking about pure value-added analysis is Ashenfelter and Card (1985).
assessing charter school students' test scores.  We conclude that modern methods that essentially rely on
comparison to public school students who may or may not be applicants, such as matching and the
propensity score, appear promising but need to be validated by lottery-based results because the
researcher has so much discretion about how he remedies the selection problem.  We conclude that pure
value-added methods, in which a researcher compares the a student's rates of gain before and after
applying to charter school, are not at all appropriate in practice.  This is because such methods require
that a student has been tested for at least two years in the traditional public schools prior to applying. 
Thus, the sample to which the results are local is even more non-representative than the 36 percent of
students whom we identified above as having prior test scores.  We required them only to have a single
prior test score and yet found that they were obviously non-representative.  If we require them to two
prior test scores so that we can compute a pre-application gain, our sample falls to a mere 16 percent of
the applicants.
Moreover, the problem is not merely one of non-representativeness (which might merely cause us
to estimate an effect that could not be extrapolated).  The problem is the classic program evaluation
problem.  Just as people are motivated to join training programs only when something happens that
usually makes their past gains uninformative about their future gains in the absence of training, students
are motivated to apply to charter schools only when something happens that usually makes their past
gains uninformative about their future gains in the absence of the charter school.  Applying pure value-
added analysis is as naive in the charter school context as it is in the training context.
23
VI.  The Lotteries and their Usefulness for Analysis of Achievement
In 2004 and 2005, the years for which we have the most complete application data, about 94
percent of applicants participated in lotteries.  About 91 percent of all recorded applicants participated in
lotteries.  (These percentages can be derived from the numbers in Table 5.)
The left hand panel of Table 10 shows the predetermined characteristics of applicants who are
lotteried-in and the differences between them and the compliers, decliners, and lotteried-out students. 
Lottery fixed-effects are removed before the differences are computed so that we are examining intra-
lottery differences.  There are no statistically significant differences at the 95 percent level between the
lotteried-in and lotteried-out.  The few statistically significant differences between compliers and
decliners are small:  compliers are very slightly more likely to be female and less likely to participate in29
special education or English Language Learners.  Differences between compliers and decliners are useful
for thinking about the population to which the estimates are local, but the differences in question are so
small in magnitude that one can continue thinking about the applicants as the local group. 
The overall similarity of the lotteried-in and lotteried-out does not mean that every individual
lottery is balanced on the predetermined characteristics.  We would expect that some lotteries would be
unbalanced in one way and others in another way, cancelling out since there are large number of lotteries. 
Of course, the same cancelling-out might be expected of the unobservable variables.   Thus, as mentioned
above, we might proceed with using all the data from students who participate in  lotteries, and we do
show specification tests with these results.  However, since randomization occurs at the lottery level and
we cannot confidently assume that each of our lotteries is an independent draw from the same population,
it is more conservative only to assume that individual lotteries that are balanced on the predetermined
characteristics are balanced on the unobservable variables.
Using Hotelling's T  test set at the 95 percent level, we find that 86 percent of students who
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participated in a lottery in 2005-06 were in a lottery identified as balanced and that, if we exclude
siblings, the percentage is 94 percent.  This is about what we would expect from random lotteries. 
(Siblings can cause unbalancedness because they were not really lotteried-in in the lottery in which they
appear.  As noted before, it is more correct to think of families participating a lottery when their oldest
child applies to a charter school.)
The applicants who are lotteried-in after participating in balanced lotteries are not statistically
significantly different from all applicants who are lotteried-in.  Among applicants who participated in
balanced lotteries, there are no statistically significant differences between the lotteried-in and lotteried-
out, and there are same few statistically significant differences between compliers and decliners: 
compliers are slightly more likely to be female and less likely to participate in special education or
English Language Learners.  In short, it appears that those who participated in balanced lotteries are
representative of all lottery participants.
Table 11 shows the availability of test data from participants in balanced lotteries.  The rows are
the tests, the columns are the school years in which the tests were taken, and the cells in the table show
the number of test-takers.  For example, the uppermost left-hand cell shows that 3,111 students who had
participated in balanced lotteries took the third grade tests in 2005-06.  The vast majority of these students
participated in kindergarten lotteries.  (That is, the cell does not show how many students participated in
balanced third grade lotteries in 2005-06.)  Note that many students who participated in balanced lotteries
would not have reached a test-taking grade by 2005-06.
Looking at the right-hand column of Table 11, we see that when we use all of the years available,30
  Two of the charter schools that currently offer high school grades have opened or rolled up to
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these grades very recently and provide only a little data.  The two charter schools that might seem to have
considerable numbers of high school aged students in 2005-06 do not actually generate much data on
Regents Examinations from students who participated in balanced lotteries.  Wildcat Academy is a school
for likely drop-outs and it has not run lotteries for most grades in most years (although it has run lotteries
recently).  Renaissance Charter School is a conversion school that offers kindergarten through the twelfth
grade.  Most of its current high school aged students were admitted in its pre-conversion days when it
admitted students according to district priorities as well as a lottery.  In any case, the school did not
archive application data beyond one year so that most of the Renaissance applicants who participated in
available balanced lotteries are currently in grades kindergarten through eight. 
we have between about 3000 and 7800 observations for each of the grade three through eight tests. 
However, we have fewer than 100 observations for each of the Regents Examinations.  This is simply
because so few applicants who participated in balanced lotteries for which we have data are in high
school by 2005-06.   It is fairly obvious that we have insufficient data to generate meaningful results
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from the Regents Examinations, but we show below what we obtain.
VII.  Lottery-based Analysis of Test Scores
Tables 12 and 13 present the main test score results of this report.  In each case, our preferred
specification is in the far left-hand column, and specification tests are shown in the remaining columns. 
The top row shows the coefficient on time enrolled in the charter school--the treatment variable, and the
remaining rows provide details on the specification.
New York City's charter schools raise their third through eighth graders' math scores by 0.09
standard deviations for every year they spend in the school. These gains are relative to whatever gains the
students would have been expected to make in the traditional public schools, had they been lotteried-out.
The result is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.001.  Because most of the observations of
the treatment variable are between one to three years and all of them are between one to six years, this
result should not be extrapolated beyond four years of enrollment in charter school.
When we change the set of covariates for which we control, the coefficient moves only a little: 
up to 0.10 or 0.11.  (See Table 12.)  We expect only a small amount of movement with an estimate based
on randomization.  Indeed, the movement implicitly tests whether randomization has actually balanced
the lotteried-in and lotteried-out students.  Excluding students who have sibling priority and adjusting for
attrition (with standard upweighting of students whose observable characteristics are the same as the
attritors) hardly affect the coefficient.  Including all lotteries regardless of whether they are balanced
reduces the coefficient to 0.06, but it remains statistically significantly different from zero with very high
confidence.31
New York City's charter schools raise their third through eighth graders' reading scores by 0.04
standard deviations for every year they spend in the school. These gains are of course relative to whatever
gains the students would have been expected to make in the traditional public schools, had they been
lotteried-out. The result is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.02.  Again, we would not
extrapolate this result beyond four years of enrollment in charter school.
When we change the set of covariates for which we control, the coefficient moves between 0.04
and 0.07.  (See Table 13.)  Again, the small amount of movement implicitly tests whether randomization
has actually balanced the lotteried-in and lotteried-out students.  Excluding students who have sibling
priority and adjusting for attrition (with standard upweighting of students whose observable
characteristics are the same as the attritors) hardly affect the coefficient.  The coefficient remains at 0.04
when we include all lotteries regardless of whether they are balanced.
New York City most often reports test scores in terms of the state's performance levels or scale
scores.  In 2005-06, depending on the grade, a standard deviation was 41 to 43 scale score points in math
and 39 to 41 scale score points in reading.  In the same year, depending on the grade, a student's math
scale score had to rise by an average of 32 points to go from the top of the Performance Level 1 range
(not meeting learning standards) to the bottom of the Performance Level 3 range (meeting learning
standards).  The equivalent required rise in a student's reading score was 44 points.  See Appendix Figures
1 and 2.
Thus, the principal effects estimated in Tables 12 and 13 can be translated as students' math scale
scores rising by 3.75 to 3.98 points (depending on the grade) and their reading scale scores rising by 1.53
to 1.61 points (depending on the grade) for every year they spend in charter schools.  Alternatively, one
can translate them as students' math performance rising by about 12 percent of a performance level and
reading performance rising by about 3.5 percent of a performance level for every year they spend in
charter schools.
There are several possible explanations for charter schools’ effects being larger and more precise
in math than in reading.  The most likely explanation, we believe, is that schools largely control math
education but that both families and schools exert influence over reading.  If, for instance, the families of
lotteried-in and lotteried-out students had the same effect on reading and families controlled half the gains
in reading, then the difference between the estimated math and reading effects would be rather fully
explained.
We have explored a variety of breakdowns of the principal effects estimated above:  effects by
grade of entry, by grade of the test, and by the school year in which the test was administered.  None of
these breakdowns proved to be meaningful in the following sense:  the standard errors increased32
  We were initially surprised not to find that the breakdown on grade-of-entry was important. 
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This is because Hoxby and Rockoff (2004), using similar lottery-based methods on Chicago charter
schools, found that students who entered in early grades experienced significant positive effects but that
effects for late-grade entrants varied substantially with the covariates, had large standard errors, and were
often not statistically significantly different from zero.  We suspect that Chicago's grade-of-entry effects
are much more systematic than New York's because the main intake grade in Chicago is kindergarten for
nearly all charter schools.  Moreover Chicago's charter schools are far more homogeneous than the New
York City's, so that it is reasonable to find an effect that holds across schools.  In New York City, effects
may be more likely to hold across dimension within a charter school than within a dimension across
charter schools.  Finally, Hoxby and Rockoff do not limit their analysis to balanced lotteries, and
numerous lotteries for late grades of entry were unbalanced.
considerably and the point estimates displayed no pattern beyond being centered on the principal effects
already described.  We conclude that more data are needed to make such breakdowns useful.   We also
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broke down the principal effects by the student's gender and being black non-Hispanic versus Hispanic. 
(There are too few applicants who belong to the other racial groups to analyze them.) The results, shown
in Table 14, indicate that the charter schools' effect is extremely consistent across males and female
students and across black and Hispanic students.   Not only are the coefficients not different across gender
or race/ethnicity in a statistical sense, they are very similar in an educational sense.
In Table 15, we show the Regents Examination analysis available at this time.  Prior to seeing the
results, we decided to show effects only for tests in which we had sufficient power to produce standard
errors that were less than a standard deviation on the test.  We end up showing just the coefficient for
Math A, a test focusing on basic algebra and geometry that is recommended for tenth graders but taken by
some students in our sample as early as the eighth grade.  The coefficient is positive but has such a large
standard error that its p-value is 0.76. 
VIII.  Variation in Lottery-based Estimates of Effects Among Charter Schools and the Associations
between these Effects and Schools' Policies
We are able to estimate school-specific effects on the grade three through eight tests for 32
individual charter school--that is, all of the charter schools that have students in grades three through
eight.  The remaining three test-taking schools offer only high school grades.  However, because the
schools are of different ages and sizes, the precision of the individual schools' effects varies greatly.
About one third of individual charter schools have estimated effects that are so noisy that it is not
worthwhile comparing them as point estimates with other schools' estimated effects except in a statistical
setting where we can formally account for precision.  (We do this below.)  Visual inspection of the point
estimates is useful for the other two thirds of the individual charter schools' estimated effects.  (We view33
  We are not saying that the effect of attending a charter school is a reasonably precisely
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estimated zero for the remaining 36 percent of students. We are saying that our visual inspection of point
estimates--a form of analysis that does not make it easy to consider precision--is helpful only with point
estimates that are reasonably precise.  We include all charter schools in the statistical analysis below
where we can explicitly account for precision.  Of course, we also include all applicants' achievement in
the estimates of the average charter school effects (0.09 standard deviations in math, 0.04 standard
deviations in reading) described above.
an individual charter school's estimated effect as too noisy to contribute to the visual inspection if is not
only statistically insignificant but if also its standard error is such that an effect of 0.1 standard deviations
would be statistically insignificant at the 95 percent level.)  
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Figure 5 shows the range of estimated effects of New York City's charter schools on math in
grades three through eight. We created this figure by estimating an effect on math for each school
separately. Then we plotted the distribution of the schools' effects on students.  That is, the distribution of
effects is representative of the charter school students of New York City.  We smoothed the distribution
slightly so that readers could not pick out the effects of individual charter schools.  The distribution of
estimated math effects of New York City's charter schools (the shaded distribution with three peaks)
shows that about 19 percent of charter school students attend a school that is estimated to have a positive
effect on math that is greater than 0.3 standard deviations. About 56 percent of charter school students
attend a school that is estimated to have a positive effect on math that is between 0.1 and 0.3 standard
deviations. About 18 percent of charter school students attend a school that is estimated to have an effect
on math between 0 and 0.1 standard deviations, and the remaining six percent of students attend a school
that is estimated to have an effect on math that is negative.
Figure 6 shows the parallel distribution for reading.  About 9 percent of charter school students
attend a school that is estimated to have a positive effect on reading that is greater than 0.3 standard
deviations. About 71 percent of charter school students attend a school that is estimated to have a positive
effect that is between 0.1 and 0.3 standard deviations. About 13 percent of charter school students attend
a school that is estimated to have an effect between 0 and 0.1 standard deviations, and the remaining eight
percent of students attend a school that is estimated to have an effect that is negative.
It is natural to ask whether charter schools' estimated effects are systemically associated with
certain policies.  At this time, we have very limited ability to answer this question because we have 64
observations of schools' effects in 32 clusters of two non-independent effects.  That is, we have 32
schools and two subjects, and the effect in each subject is potentially informative but not independent of
the same school's effect in the other subject.  Nevertheless, we investigate whether certain school policies
are associated with positive effects on achievement using multiple regression.  To account for34
heteroskedasticity, we give weight to a school's estimated effect commensurate with the precision of the
estimate.  We include subject fixed effects, and estimate robust standard errors clustered at the school
level to account for the non-independence of each schools' two estimated effects.
We have no way to estimate how charter schools' policies causally change their effects on
achievement.  We can describe only associations between policies and achievement effects, and the
distinction between association and causation is very important in practice in the charter school context. 
For instance, suppose that charismatic school leaders were a key cause of positive achievement effects,
and suppose that charismatic leaders just happened to like long school years.  We cannot measure
charisma, but we can measure the length of the school year.  Therefore, we might find an association
between a long school year and positive achievement effects even if the charisma , and not the long
school year, caused higher achievement.  A school that lengthened its school year would be disappointed
in the results, not realizing that what it had really needed to do was to hire a charismatic leader.
Another problem is multicollinearity.  Charter schools tend to adopt loose packages of policies.  
For instance, schools that adopt a long school year very often also adopt a long school day.  Appendix
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix.  If one policy in a package is measured well (in the sense that its
variation accurately represents variation in the package) and other policies in the package are measured
poorly, an association may load on the well-measured policy even it is not essential to the package.  In
short, there are three good reasons (the need for more data, the lack of causal effects, and
multicollinearity) to be cautious about the associations between policies and charter schools' estimated
effects.  We would not be surprised to find that some associations change substantially in next year's
report.
Table 16 shows the results of  the regression analysis.  We find that a charter school's years in
operation has an association with achievement effects that is not statistically significantly different from
zero.  It is interesting to note, however, that if we do not control for policies and look at the univariate
association between a charter school's years in operation and its achievement effect, we find that older
schools have more positive achievement effects.  The fact that this correlation disappears when we control
for policies suggests that the reason older schools have more positive achievement effects is that they
adopt more effective policies.  A charter school's operating agency type does not have association with
achievement effects that is statistically significantly different from zero.  It is interesting to note, however,
that if we do not control for a school's policies and we look at the association between a charter school's
agency type and its achievement effect, we find statistically significant correlations.  The fact that these
correlations disappear when we control for policies indicates to us it is not agency type that matters but
the policies that schools adopt.35
A long school year is associated with positive achievement effects, and the coefficient indicates
that schools with years that are ten days longer are associated with achievement effects that are 0.2
standard deviations higher.  This is an association of considerable magnitude, and a ten day difference is
quite common.  (Twelve days is the standard deviation in the length of the school year among charter
schools.)  However, it is important to note that a long school year is correlated with several other policies
and this multicollinearity should make us cautious about interpreting the variable literally.  A long school
day and Saturday School have associations with achievement effects that are not statistically significantly
different from zero, but these policies are strongly correlated with a long school year (and the year is
probably better measured).  The multicollinearity problem is such that readers may wish to think of the
package of a long school year, long school day and Saturday School rather than focus on the long school
year by itself.
Optional after-school programs, most math curricula, and most reading curricula do not have
associations with achievement effects that are statistically significantly different from zero.  (Note that
omitted curricular category is a mixture of other programs, each of which is adopted by a few schools at
most.  We describe the more common curricula in the appendix.)  However, Everyday Math and Open
Court reading have negative and statistically significant associations with achievement effects.  We
strongly discourage readers from interpreting their coefficients as causal effects since an equally if not
more plausible interpretation is that these are curricula that schools adopt when their students struggle
with learning deficits.
Class size has an association with achievement effects that is estimated with a fair degree of
precision and that is not statistically significantly different from zero.  Interestingly enough, larger class
size is often found in packages with longer school years.  We surmise that if a school wants to adopt a
longer school year, it needs to find room in its budget.  By raising class size by, say, four students, a
school may be able to free up twenty percent of its budget, allowing an expansion of the school year.
The coefficients on internal evaluations, school uniforms, a dress code, the No Broken Windows
disciplinary policy, and a parent contract all have such large standard errors that the coefficients do not
provide evidence one way or the other about their associations with achievement.  That is, these are not
precisely estimated zero effects.  We need more data, especially since there is very little variation among
charter schools in the adoption of the first three policies (they are very common).
The policy of reserving one or more seats on the board for parents and a school's number of
leaders both have positive associations with achievement effects that are close to the margin of being
statistically significantly different from zero (the p-values are 0.116 and 0.163).  There are a number of
other school characteristics that we did not include in the regression because there was insufficient36
variation in their use among New York City charter schools.  This highlights the importance of policy
variation among the schools if we are to learn about associations.  To the extent that the schools converge
on a common set of policies, we will find it difficult to discern the associations.
Because the long school year is strongly positively associated with achievement and seems
unlikely to be adopted because students are performing better than expected (that is, reverse causality and
selection on positive unobservables seem unlikely), we plan to stay attentive to packages of policies that
include a longer year, which can be as many as 220 days in New York City charter schools.37
References
Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D.  1985. "Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect
of Training Programs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 67.4 (November), pp.
648-60. 
Burghardt, J., Silva, T., and Hulsey, L. 2004  “Case Study of National School Lunch Program
Verification Outcomes in Large Metropolitan School Districts.” Special Nutrition Program
Report Series, No. CN-04-AV3. Project Officer: Paul Strasberg. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Analysis, Nutrition and Evaluation, Alexandria, VA.
Center for Education Reform.  2007.  Charter School Laws in the 50 States.  Washington, DC:  Center for
Education Reform.
Cullen, J., and Rivkin, S.  2003.  "The Role of Special Education in School Choice," in C. Hoxby, ed.,
The Economics of School Choice.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.
Hoxby, C., and Murarka, S.  2007.  "Methods of Assessing Achievement of Students in Charter Schools,"
in ed. M. Behrens, Charter School Outcomes.  New York:  The Analytic Press.
Hoxby, C., and Rockoff, J.  2004.  "The Impact of Charter Schools on Student Achievement," Harvard
University working paper.
New York City Department of Education.  2007.  Basic Education Data System [machine-readable data].
Ruggles, S., Sobek, M., Alexander, T., Fitch, C., Goeken, R., Hall, P., King, M., and Ronnander, C. 
2007.  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0 [machine-readable data].
Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor]. 
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/ (accessed July 2007). 
United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Office of Analysis, Nutrition and
Evaluation.  2003.  School Food Authority Administration of National School Lunch Program
Free and Reduced Price Eligibility Determination, CN-03-AV, by Paul J. Strasberg. Alexandria,
VA.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  2002.  Census of Population and Housing
Summary File 1 [machine-readable data].  Washington, DC.  www.census.gov (accessed July
2006).
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.  2002.  Census of Population and Housing
Summary File 3 [machine-readable data].  Washington, DC.  www.census.gov (accessed July
2006).38
Figure 1
Map of New York City Charter Schools
2005-0639
Figure 2
Authorizers of the New York City Charter Schools
2005-06
Figure 3
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Figure 4
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Notes: The shaded area shows the distribution of estimated effects of charter schools on math (grades three through
eight) that are sufficiently precise that they are either statistically significantly different from zero or that an effect of
0.1 standard deviations would be statistically significantly different from zero with 95 percent confidence. The point
estimates line includes some estimates that are very imprecise (so imprecise that the confidence interval includes
implausibly extreme effects that are both negative and positive).
Figure 542
Notes: The shaded area shows the distribution of estimated effects of charter schools on math (grades three through
eight) that are sufficiently precise that they are either statistically significantly different from zero or that an effect of
0.1 standard deviations would be statistically significantly different from zero with 95 percent confidence. The point
estimates line includes some estimates that are very imprecise (so imprecise that the confidence interval includes
implausibly extreme effects that are both negative and positive).
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Table 1




open and in this
study
Number of Schools Offering...
 K123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
1 9 9 9 - 0 0 2 1111011110000
2000-01 10 6 7 4 3244222222
2001-02 15 10 12 10 6455532222
2002-03 17 12 13 14 1 2775562222
2003-04 22 16 17 15 1 6 1 3 1 16563222
2004-05 31 23 24 20 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 2764322
2005-06 47 (42 covered
by this report)
33 35 26 22 17 26 18 11 9 4 4 3 2
planned 34 35 35 35 35 42 32 28 29 13 13 13 13
Notes:  The table shows the number of New York City charter schools participating in this study and the grades
offered by them in each school year.  The final row shows the grades that they plan to offer.  Bold typeface
demarcates grades and years for which we have useful data from statewide tests administered in New York.
Sources:  Authors' calculations based on information provided by the charter schools, the New York State Board of
Regents, the New York City Basic Educational Data System, and the New York City Center for Charter School
Excellence.44
Table 2
Student Applicants by Grade, 
New York City Charter Schools, All Years through 2005-06














Notes:  The table shows the percentage of applicants to New York City charter schools who have
applied to each grade over the 2000-01 and 2005-06 school years.  Charter schools covered by this
report are included.  Intake grades in New York City charter schools are kindergarten, one, five,
and nine.  See text for more on the grade spans of the charter schools. 
Sources:  Authors' calculations based on application data provided by the charter schools.45
Table 3
The Neighborhoods of Charter Schools versus New York City as a Whole
Statistics based on Tracts in 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing
Characteristic
average tract in which a
charter school is located
average tract in all of
New York City
% White (non-Hispanic) 12.2% 35.0%
% Black (non-Hispanic) 46.1% 24.5%
% Hispanic 35.6% 27.0%
% Asian 2.8% 9.7%
Median family income $28,993 $41,887
% living in poverty 31.4% 21.2%
% of adults with high school diploma + 59.6% 72.3%
% of adults with bachelor’s degree + 16.4% 27.4%
% of school-aged children living with a single
female householder 39.2% 28.8%
Source:  Authors' calculations based on Summary File 1 and Summary File 3 of the 2000 Census of Population and
Housing.46
Table 4
Policies and Practices of New York City Charter Schools
Policy or practice (2005-06)





Operated by a Charter Management Organization (CMO) 28.6% 18.4%
Operated by an Education Management Organization (EMO) 16.7% 25.3%
Operated by a Community Grown Organization (CGO) 54.8% 56.3%
Long school day (8 hours or more) 54.8% 45.5%
Long school year (190 days or more) 64.3% 57.1%
Optional after-school program available 66.7% 69.0%
Saturday School (mandatory for all or certain students) 57.1% 59.7%
Long English/language arts period (over 90 minutes) 53.7% 55.0%
Long mathematics period (90 minutes or more) 53.7% 54.2%
Saxon Math curriculum 40.5% 36.8%
Everyday Math curriculum 23.8% 32.5%
Open Court Reading curriculum 23.8% 26.5%
Core Knowledge curriculum 38.1% 35.5%
Student-faculty advisory 38.1% 38.8%
Internal assessments regularly administered 95.1% 93.0%
Parent contract 52.4% 48.9%
Seat on the Board of Trustees reserved for a parent 52.4% 58.5%
No Broken Windows disciplinary philosophy 21.4% 13.5%
Uniforms required 90.5% 80.7%
Teachers unionized 16.7% 21.9%
Merit pay or bonuses for teachers 48.8% 50.2%
Notes:  More detailed descriptions of these policies may be found in the text.
Source:  Authors' calculations based on descriptions provided by the charter schools.  Preliminary descriptions were
based on charter schools' published materials.  These were confirmed, amplified, and corrected by charter school
personnel in 2006.47
Table 5
Matching of Charter Schools Applicants to their Records in the New York City
Department of Education (DOE) Database, By Year of Intended Entry into Charter School













Number of recorded applicants
to charter schools in study 14,301 9,610 5,523 2,957 3,238 1,613
a
% Matched to DOE data 90.8% 88.4% 88.7% 82.8% 79.2% 88.0%
Number of recorded applicants
to charter schools who
participated in lotteries
13,400 9,044 5,278 2,776 2,613 936
% Matched to DOE data 91.1% 88.9% 88.1% 81.7% 74.2% 79.3%
Number of students ever
attending a NYC charter
school
b
5,104 3,450 1,727 527 1,045 1,095
Number of students who have
attended a NYC charter school
and are in study
4,817 3,416 1,673 527 1,045 1,095
Notes:
 A “recorded applicant” is a student whose application to a charter school was given to the study for matching into
a
the New York City Basic Educational Data System. Not all students who applied to charter schools are recorded
applicants because some charter schools did not keep records of their applicants from years prior to the
commencement of the study. 
 There are some early years of data for which we are missing enrollment data from certain charter schools because
b
these charter schools had not yet started using the New York City’s ATS system for tracking enrollment. These
figures also do not include the closed Reisenbach Charter School or the New York Center for Autism Charter
School.48
Table 6









Increase or decrease in probability
of attrition associated with not
being enrolled [yes/no statistically





Increase or decrease in probability
of attrition associated with being
lotteried-out [yes/no statistically
significant at 95% level]



































































Notes: A student only has the potential to attrit from the data if he or she has been observed in the data as attending a traditional public school or a charter school
for at least two-thirds of an academic year. A student is considered an attritor once he or she has been observed in the dataset for two-thirds of a year or more and
then no longer has any attendance data for any of the years afterwards. The two most common reasons a student would attrit from the data is that the student has
moved out of New York City or that the student leaves the public school system to attend a private school (or home school). A student who graduates from
twelfth grade is not considered an attritor.  Source:  Authors' calculations based on the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data.49
Table 7
Gender, Race, and Ethnicity of Charter School Applicants Versus














% female 47.87 50.17 49.15
bc
% black non-Hispanic 63.93 50.01 32.44
bc
% white non-Hispanic 3.63 2.30 14.35
bc
% Hispanic 27.03 44.89 39.20
bc
% Asian 3.27 2.27 13.56
bc





% female 48.91 50.22
% black non-Hispanic 63.46 46.83
b
% white non-Hispanic 3.55 2.47
b
% Hispanic 28.02 47.99
b
% Asian 3.00 2.20
% other race or ethnicity 0.52 0.50
Notes:
 The composite comparison school is a weighted average of traditional New York City public schools from which the
a
charter schools draw applicants.  Each school's weight is based on its share of the charter schools' applicants,
regardless of their lottery outcome.
 The difference between this number and the parallel number for charter school applicants is statistically significant
b
different from zero at the 99 percent level under the assumption that the charter schools' measured draw from
traditional public schools is the true draw.  This assumption is strong because lotteried-in kindergarten applicants'
traditional public school must be approximated and the error involved in that approximation is unknown.  The
approximation and the assumption are the reasons why the 99 percent level is used in this table rather than the 95
percent level.
 The difference between this number and the parallel number for charter school applicants is statistically significant
c
different from zero at the 95 percent level.
Source:  Authors' calculations based on the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data.50
Table 8
Proxies for Poverty, Disability, and Need to Learn English ,
a
Charter School Applicants and the Traditional Public Schools from Which They Draw Applicants
Comparison of applicants applicants for whom time-of application proxies...
are available are not available
average grade of intended entry (kindergarten=0) 3.74 1.91
b
% female 49.66 48.72
b
% black non-Hispanic 61.45 65.43
b
% white non-Hispanic 3.34 4.77
b
% Hispanic 31.49 23.39
b
% Asian 2.27 3.15
b
% other race or ethnicity 0.49 0.63
b
2005 charter school applicants for whom





All New York City
public school
students
Proxies at time of application unadjusted
adjusted to create same
grade composition as
traditional public schools
Certified for free or reduced-price lunch 91.06 93.00 86.56 73.62
dd
Participating in special education 8.07 11.12 11.47 12.56
dd
Classified as an English Language Learner 2.57 4.17 13.67 13.56
dd
Notes:
 The proxies for poverty, disability, and the need to learn English are, respectively, certification for free or reduced-price lunch, participation in special education,
a
and classification as an English Language Learner.  The variables are proxies because they measure the treatment a student receives rather than his circumstances.
  The difference between this number and the parallel number for applicants whose time-of-application data are available is statistically significant different from
b
zero at the 95 percent level.
 The composite comparison school is a weighted average of traditional New York City public schools from which the charter schools draw applicants.  Each
c
school's weight is based on its share of the charter schools' applicants, regardless of their lottery outcome.  Unfortunately, the composite comparison school shown
in this table does not have the same grade composition as the applicants.  This is unlike the previous table. These and New York City numbers are for 2005-06.
 This number is reliable in the sense of having been recorded for all schools in the table by the New York City traditional public schools.  However, this number is
d
not representative of applicants to New York City charter schools.51
Table 9
Prior Test Scores, Charter School Applicants and the Traditional Public Schools from Which They Draw Applicants
Comparison of applicants Applicants for whom prior test scores...
are available are not available
average grade of intended entry (kindergarten=0) 5.65 1.89
a
% female 50.72 48.70
a
% black non-Hispanic 55.50 66.06
a
% white non-Hispanic 3.47 4.25
a
% Hispanic 36.98 24.25
a
% Asian 3.13 2.59
a
% other race or ethnicity 0.57 0.56
Applicants for whom prior test scores are available
c












grade 3 -0.102 -0.336 0
grade 4 0.016 -0.236 0
grade 5 -0.009 -0.306 0
grade 6 -0.004 -0.126 0
grade 7 -0.250 -0.198 0






grade 3 -0.125 -0.347 0
grade 4 0.014 -0.257 0
grade 5 -0.003 -0.304 0
grade 6 0.047 -0.174 0
grade 7 -0.100 -0.259 0
grade 8 -0.100 -0.276 0
Notes:
  The difference between this number and the parallel number for applicants whose prior test scores are available is statistically significant different from zero at
a
the 95 percent level.
 A standard score is the equal to the difference between the scale score and the New York City-wide mean divided by the New York City-wide standard deviation. 
b
The city-wide means and standard deviations are specific to the grade and year.
 Students who applied to charter schools in 2001 through 2005.  We do not include the 2000 applicants to avoid conversion school entrants who were admitted in
c
pre-conversion days.
 The composite comparison school is a weighted average of traditional New York City public schools from which the charter schools draw applicants.  Each
d
school's weight is based on its share of the charter schools' applicants, regardless of their lottery outcome.
 Scores from 2004-05, the prior year for the modal applicant.  However, all scores are standardized so the year should not matter much.
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Table 10
Predetermined Characteristics of Applicants to Charter Schools




























































% female 50.05 1.06 -0.44 -0.75 0.03 1.65 -0.80 -0.99
ab a b
% black non-hispanic 63.51 0.00 -0.18 0.04 1.99 0.39 -0.17 -0.24
% white non-hispanic 4.17 -0.20 0.18 0.11 -0.99 -0.24 0.17 0.13
% hispanic 26.98 -0.04 0.51 -0.10 -0.66 -0.25 0.05 0.17
% asian 2.84 0.16 -0.44 -0.01 -0.58 0.07 0.01 -0.06
% other 0.52 -0.06 0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.13 0.03
age at the time of
application
8.42 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.75 -0.01 -0.03 0.02
% certificated for free
or reduced-price lunch 
89.68 0.01 -0.25 0.06 0.73 0.16 0.02 -0.11
% participate in special
education
7.61 -0.58 0.87 0.31 -0.45 -0.82 0.96 0.32
a a,b a a,b
% classified as english
language learners
2.03 -0.20 0.37 0.09 0.26 -0.31 0.56 0.06
bb
math standard score 0.0075 0.0181 0.0189 -0.0214 0.0158 0.0357 -0.0097 -0.0222
reading standard score 0.0073 0.0115 0.0369 -0.0200 0.0004 0.0296 0.0114 -0.0228
Notes:
The table shows the pre-lottery characteristics of students who are lotteried, who are lotteried-in and enroll in a charter school (compliers), who are lotteried and do
not enroll in a charter school (decliners), and who are lotteried-out.  Lottery fixed effects are removed before the differences shown in the table are computed.  The
following number of observations are in the columns, left to right:  20501, 15497, 5004, 18945, 11037, 7812, 3225, 10384.  Source:  Authors' calculations based on
the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data.
 Difference is statistically significantly difference from zero at the 95 percent level.
a
 Difference between decliners and compliers is statistically significantly difference from zero at the 95 percent level.
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Table 11
Number of Students Available for Assessing
the Achievement Effects of New York City's Charter Schools





Grade 3 tests 3111 1709 1265 7436
Grade 4 tests 2603 2013 1158 6902
Grade 5 tests 3586 1777 1104 7767
Grade 6 tests 3020 1539 688 6455
Grade 7 tests 1864 834 604 4278
Grade 8 tests 961 656 525 2999
Living
Environment test
41 5 92 8
Math A 
test
10 24 2 36
Global History test 6 25 0 31
Comprehensive
English test
11 14 0 25
U.S. History test 1 4 1 6
Notes: The table shows the number of test-taking students in each year who participated in balanced lotteries held by
New York City charter schools. The "All Available" column contains the total number of students over the school
years available currently from New York City Basic Educational Data System: 2000-01 to 2005-06. A school will
have no balanced lottery available if it held no lottery among applicants, if it failed to keep full application
information on lotteried-out students, or if the number of participants in the lottery was so small that the lotteried-in
and lotteried-out groups were statistically significantly different at the 90 percent level. In the years before this study
commenced, many schools failed to keep full application information on lotteried-out students simply because they
were unaware that such information might later be needed.
Source:  Authors' calculations based on the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data.54
Table 12
Lottery-Based Estimates of the Effect of Attending New York City's Charter Schools,
Per Year of Attendance, on Math Test Scores for Grades 3 through 8




























treated results yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
results based on
balanced lotteries yes yes yes yes yes yes yes











yes yes yes yes
prior test score
covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
grade of test fixed
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
school year fixed
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
lottery fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
siblings excluded








yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of attending New York City's charter schools per school year.  Robust clustered standard errors,
computed using Stata's "robust cluster" command are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. The effects shown are
treatment on the treated estimates; that is, the intention-to-treat variable described in the text is used as an instrument time enrolled in
a charter school.
Sources: Authors' calculations based on data from the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data from
charter schools.55
Table 13
Lottery-Based Estimates of the Effect of Attending New York City's Charter Schools,
Per Year of Attendance, on Reading Test Scores for Grades 3 through 8




























treated results yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
results based on
balanced lotteries yes yes yes yes yes yes yes











yes yes yes yes
prior test score
covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
grade of test fixed
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
school year fixed
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
lottery fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
siblings excluded








yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of attending New York City's charter schools per school year.  Robust clustered standard errors,
computed using Stata's "robust cluster" command are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. The effects shown are
treatment on the treated estimates; that is, the intention-to-treat variable described in the text is used as an instrument time enrolled in
a charter school.
Sources: Authors' calculations based on data from the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data from
charter schools.56
Table 14
Gender and Race/Ethnicity Breakdowns of
Lottery-Based Estimates of the Effect of Attending New York City's Charter Schools,
Per Year of Attendance, on Math and Reading Test Scores for Grades 3 through 8
Estimated Effect of Attending New York City's
Charter Schools, Per Year of Attendance,
on Math
Estimated Effect of Attending New York City's
Charter Schools, Per Year of Attendance,
on Reading
student is... student is...




























treated results yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
results based on
balanced lotteries yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
gender, race, and






yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
prior test score
covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
grade of test fixed
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
school year fixed
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes




yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of attending New York City's charter schools per school year.  Robust clustered standard errors,
computed using Stata's "robust cluster" command are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. The effects shown are
treatment on the treated estimates; that is, the intention-to-treat variable described in the text is used as an instrument time enrolled in
a charter school.
Sources: Authors' calculations based on data from the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data from
charter schools.57
Table 15
Lottery-Based Estimates of the Effect of Attending New York City's Charter Schools,
Per Year of Attendance, on Regents Examinations (scale points, not standard scores)
Estimated Effect of Attending New York City's Charter Schools, Per Year of Attendance,
 on Various Regents Examinations
Living
Environment Math A Global History Comprehensive
English U.S. History











treatment on the treated results yes yes yes yes yes
results based on balanced
lotteries yes yes yes yes yes
gender, race, and ethnicity
covariates yes yes yes yes yes
free and reduced lunch, special
education, and English learner
covariates
yes yes yes yes yes
prior test score covariates yes yes yes yes yes
grade of test fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
school year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
lottery fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
robust standard error clustered at
the student level yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of attending New York City's charter schools per school year.  Robust clustered standard errors,
computed using Stata's "robust cluster" command are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets. The effects shown are
treatment on the treated estimates; that is, the intention-to-treat variable described in the text is used as an instrument time enrolled in
a charter school.
Sources: Authors' calculations based on data from the New York City Basic Educational Data System and application data from
charter schools.58
Table 16
Associations between Charter Schools' Characteristics and







regression coefficient  p-value




(CGO) 55% -3.690 0.112
Charter Management
Organization (CMO) 29% -3.660 0.147
Educational Management
Organization (EMO) 17% -3.115 0.189
Number of Days in School Year 192.9 0.021 0.007
Number of Hours in School Day 7.9 -0.077 0.602
Saturday School 57% 0.153 0.549
Optional After-School Program  64% 0.058 0.839
Math
curriculum is
Saxon 40% 0.180 0.507
Scott Foresman 5% 0.087 0.789
Everyday 21% -0.332 0.008
Reading
curriculum is
SRA 12% -0.423 0.188
Scott Foresman 14% -0.174 0.158
Open Court 24% -0.378 0.010
Core Knowledge 38% 0.072 0.592
School's Own Math & Reading Curricula 29% 0.137 0.778
Average Class Size 23.6 0.002 0.950
Internal Evaluations Administered 95% -0.085 0.836
School Uniforms Required 88% -0.179 0.774
Dress Code (with or without uniforms) 90% 0.139 0.835
No Broken Windows Disciplinary Policy 21% 0.257 0.498
Parent Contract 50% -0.234 0.367
Reserved Seat(s) for Parent on Board 52% 0.233 0.116
Number of School Leaders 1.3 0.199 0.163
Notes:  Table shows results from a multivariate regression of charter schools' estimated achievement effects on their
characteristics and test subject indicator.  Observations are weighted by the precision (inverse of the variance) of the
charter school's estimated effect.  The p-value for the test that the coefficient is equal to zero is shown in the right-hand
column.59
Appendix
A.  Descriptions of curricula
Saxon Math
Using Saxon Math Courses 1, 2, and 3 each day, students work toward mastery in three ways: by reviewing,
maintaining and building upon previously learned skills; through direct, explicit instruction of new content,
mathematical thinking and vocabulary; and by applying, reinforcing and demonstrating cumulative learning.
Source:  http://www.harcourtachieve.com (accessed June 2007).
Scott Foresman-Wesley Addison Mathematics
Scott Foresman-Addison Wesley Mathematics (Diamond Edition) is a research-based Pre-K-6 curriculum that
focuses on developing students' conceptual understanding and skills through step-by-step instruction. The
focus is on key ideas in mathematics, rich problem-solving lessons that build the reading and writing skills
necessary for powerful problem solving, and differentiated instructional options to meet the needs of varied
learners. 
Source:  http://www.scottforesman.com (accessed June 2007).
Everyday Mathematics
Everyday Mathematics is a research-based curriculum developed by the University of Chicago School
Mathematics Project. Development of Everyday Mathematics began with a research phase. Based on their
findings, the authors established several basic principles that have guided the development of Everyday
Mathematics: Students acquire knowledge and skills, and develop an understanding of mathematics from their
own experience; children begin school with more mathematical knowledge and intuition than previously
believed; teachers, and their ability to provide excellent instruction, are the key factors in the success of any
program.
Source:  http://everydaymath.uchicago.edu/about.shtml (accessed June 2007).
SRA Reading Mastery Plus
Reading Mastery Plus gives students the skills and the clear, explicit instruction and guidance they need to
master the fundamentals of reading. Oral language, phonemic awareness, and systematic phonics are the
starting point. Vocabulary development, fluency, and comprehension are fundamental throughout. The
program is set up so students are active participants. Group responses make learning highly efficient and
enable teachers to provide instant feedback that confirms or corrects their responses. Less-structured activities
and opportunities for independent work help students develop self-reliance. On-going assessment tools are
used by the instructor to ensure that no student "falls though the cracks." 
Source:  www.sraonline.com (accessed June 2007).
Scott Foresman Reading Street
Scott Foresman Reading Street 2008 is an all-new reading program for Grades PreK-6. Reading Street is
designed to help teachers build readers through motivating and engaging literature, scientifically
research-based instruction, and a wealth of reliable teaching tools. The program takes the guesswork out of
differentiating instruction with a strong emphasis on ongoing progress-monitoring and an explicit plan to help
with managing small groups of students. In addition, Reading Street prioritizes skill instruction at each grade
level, so teachers can be assured they will focus on the right skill, at the right time, and for every student.  
Source:  http://www.scottforesman.com (accessed June 2007).
Open Court Reading
Open Court Reading is a complete elementary basal reading program for Grades K-6. It maintains strong
instruction in the areas of decoding (learning how to read), comprehension (understanding what you read),
inquiry and investigation (learning how to apply what you have read), and writing (how to communicate with60
others in print). Open Court Reading is designed such that no assumptions are made about students' prior
knowledge. Each skill is systematically and explicitly taught in a logical progression to develop understanding
and mastery. 
Source:  www.sraonline.com (accessed June 2007).
Core Knowledge Reading
Core Knowledge does not at present require any particular reading program. Schools are free to select from
programs on the market. However, we recommend that schools choose a program that has strong phonics
instruction, and we recommend that schools build oral language through frequent reading aloud on topics in
the Core Knowledge Sequence. An ideal reading program will include good phonics instruction (followed by
fluency work) combined with frequent reading aloud to expose children to new words and key subjects like
the subjects listed in the Core Knowledge Sequence. Moreover, the reading aloud will include not only
fictional stories but also generous amounts of nonfiction.
Source:  www.coreknowledge.org (accessed June 2007).6162
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number of hours in school day 1
number of days in school year 0.57 1
Saturday school 0.22 0.36 1
optional after-school -0.4 -0.3 0.1 1
Saxon math 0.13 0.14 0 0.1 1
Scott Foresman math 0 -0.2 -0.3 0.16 -0.2 1
Everyday math 0 0 0.23 0 -0.2 0.15 1
SRA reading 0.14 0 0.18 0.27 0.16 0 -0.2 1
Scott Foresman reading 0 0 0.1 0 -0.2 0.23 0.61 -0.2 1
Open Court reading 0.31 0 0 0 0.36 0.14 0 0 -0.2 1
Core Knowledge reading 0.29 0 -0.1 0 0.49 0.28 0 0.16 0.1 0.48 1
own math/reading curriculum 0.65 0.55 0.25 -0.4 0 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.13 0 1
average class size 0.36 0.15 0.34 -0.2 0.24 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.48 0.2 0.31 1
internal evaluations -0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.18 -0.1 0.11 1
school uniforms 0.35 0.11 0 0.1 0.15 0.1 -0.2 0.14 0.15 0 0.3 0 0.17 0.26 1
d r e s s  c o d e 0 0 . 1 20 0 . 1 50000 0 . 4 2 - 0 . 20 - 0 . 2 0 . 1 0 . 2 5 0 . 6 61
No Broken Windows 0.57 0.37 0.47 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.52 -0.2 0.25 0.3 0.57 0.33 0.12 0.2 0 1
parent contract 0.3 0.2 0.22 0 0.38 -0.2 0 0 -0.2 0.21 0.18 0.1 0.13 0 0.23 0.1 0.28 1
parent on board -0.4 -0.3 0 0.12 -0.1 0.22 0.4 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0 0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 1
number of school leaders 0 0.16 0 -0.1 0 -0.2 0 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0 1
Notes:  The correlations shown provide answers to questions of the form, "If a school has policy of Saturday school, how likely is it all to have a policy of optional
after-school programing.  Note that some variables are continuous (numbers of hours in the school day and so on).  Source:  charter school descriptions.